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Article
Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy
SAMIR D. PARIKH
In 1978, changes to the venue rules for bankruptcy cases created
surprisingly permissive venue selection procedures. Since that time,
corporate bankruptcy cases have been characterized by harmful forum
shopping. Recently, some skeptics have argued that forum shopping in
bankruptcy is vastly overstated—a phenomenon that peaked many years
ago. An empirical review of the 159 largest bankruptcy cases filed from
January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2012 establishes that this assessment is false.
69% of the bankruptcy cases in my study group were forum shopped. Over
a two-decade period, the frequency with which large corporate debtors
forum shopped increased 14%, and the absolute number of such debtors
who forum shopped increased 130%. The data indicate a concentrated
problem that must be addressed. This Article relies on empirical data and
theoretical analysis to propose a variety of solutions that would effect
changes to the bankruptcy venue statute and procedures. These proposed
changes culminate in a truly unprecedented recommendation that alters
fundamental elements of our bankruptcy court structure. Based in part on
the system for appeals of patent and trademark rulings, this Article
proposes the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy. This
appellate court would establish a critical mass of bankruptcy experts fully
devoted to addressing disparate treatment of case-dispositive issues across
the circuits. The creation of this court would ultimately enhance
uniformity of bankruptcy law and, when taken together with this Article’s
other proposed changes, alter forum shoppers’ incentives and means.
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Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy
SAMIR D. PARIKH*
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2011, the Los Angeles Dodgers were experiencing terminal
cash flow difficulties due to unfortunate business decisions, declining
attendance, and deferred compensation payments owed to former players.1
The team’s financial death spiral had been unfolding for many months and
prompted Major League Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig to appoint an
examiner to oversee all aspects of the Dodgers’ business and day-to-day
operations.2 On June 20, 2011, the Commissioner refused to allow the
team to enter into a hastily negotiated television contract with Fox Sports
and urged team owner Frank McCourt to sell the team to a more stable
ownership group.3
On June 27, 2011, the Los Angeles Dodgers filed for bankruptcy.4 At
the time, the team faced the dire prospect of defaulting on its June 30
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1
Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day
Motions at 8, In re L.A. Dodgers LLC, 457 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (No. 11-12010(KG))
[hereinafter Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram].
2
Michael McCarthy, Chat, No Clarity for Dodgers, USA TODAY, May 13, 2011, at 5C. As
Commissioner, Mr. Selig is able to take this kind of action if he deems it to be in the “the best interests
of baseball.” See Bill Madden, Powers that Bud. Selig Has ‘Best Interests of Baseball’—and History—
on His Side in Battle with McCourt, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 24, 2011, at 66 (noting that the MLB
commissioner’s power has been upheld in two previous cases). The Supreme Court has exempted
baseball from federal antitrust laws since 1922. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (refusing to conclude that providing baseball games is
a “subject of commerce”); see also Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1953) (“In
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922), this Court held that the business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of
professional baseball players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”).
3
Richard Sandomir, Selig Rejects Dodgers’ TV Deal with Fox, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at
B13; see McCarthy, supra note 2 (noting that MLB Commissioner Bud Selig did not indicate when and
if he would sign off on the deal, indicating that the television contract was contingent on MLB’s
approval).
4
Bankruptcy Petition, In re L.A. Dodgers, 457 B.R. 308 (No. 11-12010(KG)).
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5

payroll. Bankruptcy was the only viable option, and the filing did not
come as a surprise. However, the location of the filing did. The Los
Angeles Dodgers filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware.6 The
iconic Los Angeles baseball team’s primary assets, key employees,
headquarters, operations, and bankruptcy attorneys were all located in
Southern California. The team had no meaningful connection to Delaware,
but that is where this billion-dollar case landed.7 Why?
Beginning in 2007, a torrent of large-scale bankruptcy cases flooded
the courts and reintroduced the unique forum shopping problem that
permeates the corporate bankruptcy world.8 In 1991, Professors Lynn
LoPucki and William Whitford were the first to publicize the forum
shopping phenomenon in bankruptcy.9 Their article presented an empirical
study of the bankruptcy reorganizations of the forty-three largest publicly
held companies that were filed and completed between 1979 and 1988.10
The study found that a “substantial number” of cases had forum shopped.11
Over twenty years have passed since the publication of this seminal article.
The flurry of bankruptcy filings during the last five years provide a wealth
of useful data for understanding new trends in the field and warrant a reexamination of the forum shopping phenomenon that many believe has
dissipated.
By gathering and evaluating empirical data for the 159 largest
bankruptcy cases filed from January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2012 (the “Great
Recession”), I was able to determine whether forum shopping is still a
systemic issue in bankruptcy. The results were significant. The forum
shopping phenomenon that Professors LoPucki and Whitford first
identified in 1991 was actually amplified in the Great Recession. Seven
5

See Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 1, at 14.
Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 4.
7
On April 13, 2012, the Delaware bankruptcy court approved a sale of the team and substantially
all of its assets to Guggenheim Baseball Management for over $1.5 billion. See Exhibit A, LLC
Interest Purchase Agreement, In re L.A. Dodgers, 457 B.R. 308 (No. 11-12010(KG)) (showing the
purchase price).
8
See infra Part III (introducing post-2007 research regarding this wave of large-scale bankruptcy
cases).
9
See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 12 n.2 (noting
the lack of scholarly work and empirical studies on forum shopping). Professors LoPucki and Whitford
use the term “‘forum shop[ping]’ . . . to refer to the ultimate choice of a venue where the company has
little or no physical presence.” Id. at 14. To state this another way, “forum shopping” is generally used
as a pejorative to describe company executives’ strategic maneuvering to file for bankruptcy in a
district that bears no material relationship to the debtor’s principal assets or principal place of business
because the executives believe that the choice will lead to some significant benefit to themselves, the
debtor, or key constituencies. See id. (“‘Forum shopping’ is commonly defined as attempting to have
one’s case heard in the forum where it has the greatest chance of success.”).
10
Id. at 12.
11
Id.
6
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out of ten corporate debtors in my study group forum shopped. I also
independently gathered data that revealed the means of forum shopping.
Therefore, my empirical analysis helped me (i) establish that the forum
shopping phenomenon continues to plague the bankruptcy system, and
(ii) isolate the primary statutory bases on which debtors relied in order to
forum shop.
Based on my research and the means by which corporate debtors
forum shop, my Article proposes a variety of solutions that effect changes
to the bankruptcy venue statute and bankruptcy procedure. These changes
culminate in a truly unprecedented recommendation that alters
fundamental elements of our bankruptcy court structure. Specifically, I
propose the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy that
would hear all appeals from district court and bankruptcy appellate panel
rulings. The new court would be premised on the system for appeals of
patent and trademark rulings, and establish a critical mass of bankruptcy
experts fully devoted to addressing the disparate treatment of casedispositive issues across the circuits. One of the primary benefits would be
to enhance uniformity of bankruptcy law and mitigate forum shopping.
Part II provides a historical perspective on the venue rules in
bankruptcy. The debate regarding forum shopping is distorted by a
number of significant misunderstandings regarding the history of the venue
rules and the policy behind them. This section presents historical insight
and clarification that does not appear in other scholarship on the issue.
Part III presents empirical data from the largest 159 bankruptcy cases filed
during the Great Recession. This section culminates in a detailed analysis
of the state of forum shopping in bankruptcy and the means by which
corporate debtors forum shop. Part IV explains how corporate debtors use
bankruptcy’s permissive venue rules to facilitate forum shopping. Part V
explores forum shoppers’ motivations and the harm that rampant forum
shopping can cause to the integrity and operation of the bankruptcy system.
Finally, Part VI details my proposed solutions to the forum shopping
problem in bankruptcy.
Ultimately, my extensive empirical research establishes that the forum
shopping phenomenon identified in 1991 was amplified in the last five
years. This Article presents a multifaceted approach to a multifaceted
problem by proposing solutions that target the bankruptcy venue statute,
bankruptcy procedure, and fundamental elements of bankruptcy court
structure. By directing efforts on three different levels, I believe the
proposals effect change in a comprehensive and unprecedented way. The
proposals do not attempt to eliminate all forms of forum shopping. Rather,
I propose myriad solutions that, when taken together, install basic
boundaries and limitations on a harmful practice that is beginning to
predominate.
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II. FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY
A. The Unique Posture of Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction is about power; venue is about location.12 Jurisdiction of
the federal courts involves a court’s ability to adjudicate a dispute and
represents a congressional grant of authority to the courts.13 Therefore,
parties to a dispute cannot confer federal jurisdiction on a court. However,
venue rules are not jurisdictional provisions but exist to serve the interests
of justice and the convenience of all parties in interest.14 Venue is best
understood as the locality of a lawsuit. It is the determination of where
judicial authority may be exercised as determined by applicable legislation
that considers a variety of blatant and subtle factors.
All civil proceedings have select venues that are optimal for
adjudication of the dispute. Scholars have dubbed these optimal venues
“natural forums”—places that most effectively consider local interests in
the dispute, the parties involved, the parties affected, and the convenience
of the parties, counsel, and witnesses.15 Determining the natural forum for
a dispute can oftentimes be troublesome.
In bankruptcy, the complexity of the process to find a natural forum is
affected by the context of the case. Individuals who file a bankruptcy
petition are required to file in the district in which they reside.16 With
some exceptions, this determination is easily made and difficult to
manipulate. Modern venue rules for natural persons have remained
virtually unchanged since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
(the “1898 Bankruptcy Act”).
On the other hand, determining the natural forum for the bankruptcy
case of a multinational corporation is far more convoluted. In typical civil
litigation, the plaintiff chooses from a variety of venue options—all of
which are presumed to be fair to the defendant because they are based on
the defendant’s actions or business.17 To the extent the plaintiff’s choice is
12
Richard F. Broude, Jurisdiction and Venue Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 231, 243 (1974).
13
E.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939).
14
See United States v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969) (“Venue is a forum limitation
imposed for the convenience of the parties. . . . [I]t may be conferred on a court either by consent or by
the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection.”); In re Bankers Trust, 403 F.2d 16, 22 (7th Cir.
1968) (“Ordinarily, no doubt the venue rules in bankruptcy will serve the interest of justice . . . .”).
15
See, e.g., Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1691 (1990)
(referring to “natural forum” as “the one closest to, most knowledgeable about, or most accessible to
the litigants”).
16
See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006) (“[A] case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court
for the district . . . in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United States, or
principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity that is the subject of such case . . . .”).
17
See Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: A
Reconsideration of Erie Principles, 79 KY. L.J. 231, 236 (1991) (noting that the rationale behind rules
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in fact inappropriate, the defendant has the right to attempt to have the
plaintiff’s choice overturned by the chosen court.18 But the defendant does
not have the right ex post to designate the specific court that will hear the
lawsuit.19 This process attempts to strike a reasonable balance. The
defendant’s actions and business provide a limited fora of venue options,
but the plaintiff has the option of choosing any venue from those fora.20
Conversely, in bankruptcy, the party who is unable to pay its debts—
the presumptive defendant in any other civil context—is the party
instituting the proceeding and selecting venue to increase its chances of a
favorable conclusion.21 In bankruptcy, the harmed parties—usually
unsecured creditors—are at the mercy of the debtor’s venue selection.22
The permissive venue rules in bankruptcy afford a corporate debtor
virtually unlimited venue options. From those options, the corporate
debtor can choose the venue that it believes will be most favorable to
ownership, management, insiders, or lenders depending on which party
exercises the most control and leverage over the decision-making
process.23 There is almost no transparency in this process and, as
explained below, once the decision is made, it is extremely difficult to
undo.
Formulating a proper understanding of the multifaceted problem of
forum shopping in bankruptcy begins with exploring the genesis of the
permissive venue rules that created the phenomenon.
B. A Historical Perspective on the Venue Rules in Bankruptcy
Since the enactment of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,24 the uncertainty
regarding the natural forum for corporate bankruptcy cases and a lack of
understanding regarding the gravity of such issues have led to significant
shifts in venue rules. Section 2(1) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act provided
that “persons” adjudged bankrupt could file a bankruptcy petition in the
“territorial jurisdiction” where they had “their principal place of business,
meant to counter forum shopping “rests on the view that it is unfair to allow a nonresident [plaintiff] to
‘shop’ between state and federal courts in order to obtain legal doctrine more favorable to his case”).
18
28 U.S.C. § 1412.
19
See id. (specifying that the district court may transfer a case to another district court).
20
NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 783 (1997).
21
See id. (noting that in bankruptcy actions, unlike in other civil actions, “[a] multitude of parties
that are not necessarily adverse to each other are brought into the bankruptcy court by the debtor to
determine the claims and interests in the property of the estate”).
22
See id. at 782 (noting the “disenfranchisement of small creditors in the current venue statute”).
23
See id. (asserting that “when a few judges, by virtue of sitting in desirable venues, are the only
judges to review certain issues, the system breaks down,” and arguing that “[d]eleting state of
incorporation as a venue option [would] increase[] the number of courts that can decide important
issues”).
24
Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549.
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resided or had their domicile . . . for the preceding six months,” or for a
longer portion of the preceding six months than in any other jurisdiction.25
The section failed to distinguish between natural persons and fictitious
entities, such as corporations. Consequently, courts initially tasked with
applying this venue rule to corporate debtors were forced to formulate their
own definitions. As a result, courts ruled that the term “domicile”
indicated a corporation’s state of incorporation.26 Thus, a corporation was
allowed to file in any district of the state in which it was incorporated.
In 1934, Congress affirmed the judiciary’s approach by adding section
77B to the federal bankruptcy laws.27 Section 77B addressed corporate
reorganizations and provided that a bankruptcy petition could be filed with
a court “in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation, during the
preceding six months or the greater portion thereof . . . had its principal
place of business or its principal assets, or in any territorial jurisdiction in
the State in which it was incorporated.”28 However, once codified, this
venue rule was short-lived.
In 1938, the Chandler Act29 (also known as the “1938 Bankruptcy
Act”) made significant changes to the theory and practice of bankruptcy
law. Congress created chapter X, which applied exclusively to large
corporations with outstanding public debt or securities.30 In drafting a
specific venue provision for chapter X debtors, Congress reversed course
and rejected the judiciary’s approach to allowing a corporation’s state of
incorporation to serve as a basis for venue. Section 128 explicitly
eliminated that option for chapter X debtors and allowed a filing only in a
“court in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation . . . had its principal
place of business or its principal assets for the preceding six months or for
a longer portion of the preceding six months than in any other
25
Id. § 2(1). The 1898 Bankruptcy Act promulgated the distinction between a bankrupt party’s
“residence” and “domicile,” as explained infra Part IV.C.1.
26
See, e.g., In re Hudson River Nav. Corp., 59 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1932) (finding that since
the corporation was incorporated in Delaware, it had its “residence and domicile in that state”); In re
R.C. Stanley Shoe Co., 8 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D.N.H. 1934) (“[A] corporation may be organized under
the laws of one state and have its principal place of business in another state and there be jurisdiction in
both states to adjudge the corporation a bankrupt.”).
27
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912, repealed by Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52
Stat. 840 (1938).
28
Id.
29
52 Stat. 840.
30
Samir D. Parikh, The Improper Application of the Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof:
Are Bankruptcy Courts Distorting Accepted Risk Allocation Schemes?, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 271, 300
(2009). The 1938 Bankruptcy Act contained four chapters for business reorganizations. H.R. REP. NO.
95-595, at 221 (1977). Chapter VIII applied to railroad reorganizations. Id. Chapter X generally
applied only to corporations with outstanding public debt or securities. See id. (“Chapter X was
designed for a thorough financial reorganization of a corporation.”). Chapter XI applied to small
business entities, partnerships, and individuals. Id. And chapter XII covered business entities involved
in real estate. Id.
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31

jurisdiction.”
This change was based on the recommendation of the
National Bankruptcy Conference’s drafting committee.32 The House
Report on the Chandler Act explained the change:
In general, the bill sets up as the only valid criterion for
jurisdiction the company’s principal place of business, or the
place of location of its principal assets. Selection of any
other jurisdiction usually means conducting the
reorganization at great distances from the place or places
where the corporation does its business. It means putting
investors to great expense and difficulty if they wish to
appear and participate in the proceedings. It means, also,
that inside groups who may be in control of a reorganization,
are able to search around for the jurisdiction in which they
estimate it is least likely, for a number of reasons, that their
conduct of the corporation will be examined; that they will be
exposed to liability, and their perpetuation in office
endangered. These defects have been met and corrected by
the bill, in limiting the venue of reorganization proceedings
to the principal place of business or the location of the
corporation’s principal assets . . . .33
Section 128 demonstrates a congressional repudiation, based on a clear
policy rationale, of the judiciary’s interpretation of section 2a(1) of the
1898 Bankruptcy Act.
In 1973, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States endorsed this repudiation34 in
31
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 886, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
32
See Alfred N. Heuston, Corporate Reorganizations Under the Chandler Act, 38 COLUM. L.
REV. 1199, 1204 & n.17 (1938) (detailing a letter sent from the Chairman of the National Bankruptcy
Conference to a Senator).
33
H.R. REP. NO. 75-1409, at 40 (1937) (emphasis added).
34
The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure govern the conduct of trials, appeals, and cases
under title 11 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006). The Rules Enabling Act of 1934
authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure, which have the force and effect of law.
Id. § 2072. The Court has delegated the work and oversight of the rulemaking process to
committees of the Judicial Conference, the principal policy-making body of the U.S. Courts.
1 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 440.10 (2011), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Procedures_for_Rules_Cmtes.pdf.
The
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Standing Committee”)
“carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect” of the federal rules as directed by the Rules
Enabling Act. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
RULES
OF
PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE
C-19
(2011),
available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2011.pdf.
Advisory
committees receive comments from a variety of parties and formulate proposed changes to specific
provisions. See id. at C-22 (“At the conclusion of the comment period the reporter shall prepare a
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drafting the new bankruptcy rules. By order dated April 24, 1973,
effective October 1, 1973, the Supreme Court prescribed the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”).35 In an attempt to avoid
the confusion caused by section 2a(1) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,
Bankruptcy Rule 116 provided unique and separate treatment for natural
persons and fictitious entities, including corporations and partnerships, and
displaced all previous venue rules.36 Rule 116(a)(1) was titled “Natural
Persons” and exclusively addressed venue for individual debtors.37 Rule
116(a)(2) was titled “Corporation or Partnership” and exclusively
addressed venue for corporate debtors.38 Rule 116(a) followed chapter X’s
approach and allowed corporate debtors to file only in a district where the
debtor had its principal place of business or principal assets or where an
affiliate of the debtor had already filed.39 The Advisory Committee Notes
that accompanied the change acknowledged that the new rule was
specifically derived from § 128 of chapter X and explicitly “eliminate[d]
the notion that residence or domicile may serve as a useful basis for

summary of the written comments received and the testimony presented at public hearings.”). The
Standing Committee independently reviews the findings of the advisory committees and, if satisfied,
recommends changes to the Judicial Conference, which in turn recommends changes to the Supreme
Court. Id. at C-24. The Court considers the proposals and can choose to officially promulgate the
revised rules. See id. at 1 (transmitting proposed amendments to the Rules to “the Supreme Court for
its consideration with a recommendation that they be adopted by the Court and transmitted to
Congress”). Congress can enact legislation to reject, modify, or defer the pending rules.
35
411 U.S. 989 (1973).
36
Although section 2a(1) is framed as a jurisdiction provision, it was interpreted as a venue
provision. See Bass v. Hutchins, 417 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir. 1969) (“Since 1952 the courts . . . have
consistently held that § 2(a)(1) . . . is a true venue provision and is not jurisdiction confining or
defining.”). Therefore, the Supreme Court was within its power to promulgate a bankruptcy rule
altering section 2a(1)’s venue provision. Puerto Rico v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 596 F.2d 1239,
1244 n.14 (5th Cir. 1979).
37
Rule 116(a)(1) stated that:
A petition by or against a natural person may be filed only in the district where the
bankrupt has had his principal place of business, residence or domicile for the
preceding 6 months or for a longer portion thereof than in any other district. A
petition by or against a natural person who has had no principal place of business,
residence, or domicile within the United States during the preceding 6 months may
be filed only in a district wherein he has property.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 116(a)(1) (1973) (repealed 1978).
38

Rule 116(a)(2) stated that:
A petition by or against a corporation or partnership may be filed only in the district
where the bankrupt has had its principal place of business or principal assets for the
preceding six months or for a longer portion thereof than in any other district, or, if
there is no such district, in any district where the bankrupt has property.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 116(a)(2) (1973) (repealed 1978).
39
FED. R. BANKR. P. 116(a)(2), (4) (1973) (repealed 1978).

2013]

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

169

40

determining venue of a corporation or partnership.”
The committee
likely reasoned that “[t]he place of incorporation frequently [had] no
relation to the business activity of the corporation . . . .”41
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197842 (the “1978 Bankruptcy Act”)
brought the rules governing venue under title 28 of the United States
Code.43 The 1978 Bankruptcy Act also consolidated many of the chapters
governing business reorganizations.44 This consolidation permeated the
new venue rules. At the time, 28 U.S.C. § 1472 established one venue
provision governing all debtors, eliminating the clear demarcation for
individual and corporate debtors.45 The section provided that a bankruptcy
petition could be filed in the district in which: (i) the person or entity was
domiciled, resided, or had its principal place of business or principal
assets; or (ii) the person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership had a
pending case.46 Under 1 U.S.C. § 1, “person” is defined to include
corporations and partnerships as well as individuals.47
Section 1472’s legislative history provides no explanation for this
consolidation of previously distinct venue provisions.48 The floor
40
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS UNDER CHAPTERS I TO
VII OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 35 (1971).
41
12 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 116.03[2] (James W. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed.
1978) (emphasis added). Note that from 1973 to 1978, the proper venue for filing a bankruptcy petition
was governed by the Bankruptcy Rules and not a statute enacted by Congress.
42
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.
(2012)).
43
Id. § 224 (last codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (1982)). This section was technically repealed and
replaced by section 102(a) of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (the
“1984 Act”). Pub L. No. 98-353, § 102, 98 Stat. 333, 334 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006)). But
28 U.S.C. § 1408 essentially duplicated § 1472 verbatim; the only change was the deletion of a comma
and spelling out “180.” In re Donald, 328 B.R. 192, 201 n.5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
44
The rationale for this consolidation was that there was no reason to maintain separate chapters
for small and large corporate debtors. The legislature pulled what it deemed to be the best provisions
out of chapters X and XI and enacted a new consolidated chapter 11. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 223
(1977).
45
28 U.S.C. § 1472 (1982).
46
Id.
47
There is some confusion regarding which defined terms are applicable to provisions under title
28. Many of the terms found in 28 U.S.C. § 1472 and 28 U.S.C. § 1408, its successor, are defined in
title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). However, terms defined in title 11 are
only applicable to provisions found in title 11. Title 1 of the United States Code contains a variety of
defined terms that apply throughout the United States Code, including title 28.
48
As noted by Professor Kenneth N. Klee in Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28
DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 942 (1979), the 1978 Bankruptcy Act followed an unorthodox route to
enactment. Therefore, in analyzing the legislative history of the act, one must consult the following
authorities in this order:

1. floor statement of Congressman Don Edwards, October 6, 1978, on final passage
of H.R. 8200; 2. floor statement of Senator DeConcini, October 5, 1978, on passage
of the final Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8200; 3. floor
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statements and congressional reports and hearings all completely ignore
§ 1472’s drastic change to the venue rules. The only direct references to
the change appear in the House Report and Senate Report, but neither is
insightful. The House Report merely notes that § 1472 is “derived from
section 2a of the [1898] Bankruptcy Act.”49 The Senate Report is similarly
opaque, noting that the new venue rules are “derived from section 2a(1) of
the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 116 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.”50
The legislature’s motivation for the apparent shift in the venue rules is
entirely unclear. Congress may have intended to simplify the language of
the venue provision and believed that the changes had no real effect.
More specifically, Congress may have believed that the concepts of
“domicile” and “residence” did not properly apply to corporate debtors.
Therefore, a corporate debtor would still be limited to a filing based on its
principal assets, its place of business, or an affiliate’s place of filing.
An alternative explanation is that Congress sought to return to the
venue rules under section 2a(1) and simply allow a corporate debtor to rely
on its state of incorporation in selecting venue. But this explanation is
flawed. If this was truly Congress’s intent, the shift in the venue rules was
drastic. For such a drastic change to be made without any discussion or
explanation appears unlikely. Further, if Congress did intend to allow a
corporate debtor to rely on its state of incorporation, it could have returned
statement of Congressman Don Edwards, September 28, 1978, on passage of the
House amendment to the Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R.
8200; 4. floor statement of Senator DeConcini, September 7, 1978, on initial passage
of the Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8200; 5. Senate Report
of the Finance Committee to accompany S. 2266 filed by Senator Long on August
10, 1978; 6. Senate Report of the Judiciary Committee to accompany S. 2266 filed
by Senator DeConcini on July 14, 1978; 7. floor statement of Congressman Don
Edwards, February 1, 1978, on passage of H.R. 8200, as amended; 8. floor statement
of Congressman Don Edwards, October 27, 1977, on consideration of H.R. 8200; 9.
House Report of the Judiciary Committee to accompany H.R. 8200 as reported filed
by Congressman Don Edwards, September 8, 1977.
Id. at 957–58 (footnotes omitted).
49
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 446 (1977).
50
S.R. REP. NO. 95-989, at 155 (1978). The only discussion of the topic in the congressional
hearings on the act is inconclusive. On January 13, 1978, A. Daniel O’Neal, Chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), appeared before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
regarding the proposed 1978 Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266
and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., 95th Cong. 750 (1977).
Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the subcommittee, asked Mr. O’Neal what venue rules should
be in place for railroads that file for bankruptcy. Id. Mr. O’Neal was unsure of the ICC’s position at
the time of the hearing, but wrote to Senator DeConcini the following month. Id. at 1309–11 (Feb. 1,
1978 letter from A. Daniel O’Neal to Sen. Dennis DeConcini). In his letter, Mr. O’Neal stated that the
ICC’s position was that a railroad company should be allowed to file only in the territorial jurisdiction
where it had its principal executive or operating office during the preceding six months. Id. at 1310.
According to the ICC, this was the “logical” place to require a filing for a variety of reasons, including
the fact that “such a provision [would] eliminate[] the possibility of forum shopping.” Id. at 1311.
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to the explicit language of section 77B of the 1934 amendments to the
1898 Bankruptcy Act. But it did not do so.
More likely, the genesis for § 1472 was the desire to simplify the
language of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, with unintended consequences
regarding forum shopping. Indeed, § 128 and its progeny involved three
thoroughly detailed venue provisions tailored to three distinct types of
debtors. Section 1472 provided one condensed paragraph that applied to
all debtors. Congress may have been motivated by the allure of simplicity
and failed to understand the consequences. If Congress had in fact made
such an oversight, its error was at least shared by legal commentators and
scholars in the field at that time. In fact, none of the law review articles
that explained the 1978 Bankruptcy Act appreciated the significance of the
venue rule changes; the majority of these articles did not even
acknowledge that changes had been made.51 However, in context, this
oversight may not be as glaring as it first appears. At the time § 1472 was
enacted, bankruptcy was not a vital component of properly functioning
business markets. There were few large multimillion-dollar bankruptcy
cases, and forum shopping by such debtors was not a concern because
venue provisions had not been abused.52 Without an understanding of the
risk of forum shopping and lacking an appreciation of the unique harm that
forum shopping in bankruptcy could pose, Congress, legal commentators,
and scholars may have all viewed § 1472’s changes as mere streamlining
of an unnecessarily detailed provision.
In the subsequent years, the new venue rules drew scant attention and
were eventually incorporated into the Bankruptcy Amendments and
51
See Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-for-Lawyers
Bill, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1–2 (noting the new venue rules but failing to appreciate the significance of
the changes); Conrad K. Cyr, Structuring a New Bankruptcy Court: A Comparative Analysis, 52 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 141 (1978) (failing to mention the changes to the venue rules); Frank R. Kennedy,
Partnerships and Partners Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act and the New (Proposed) Bankruptcy
Rules, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 507, 563–64 (1983) (merely noting that the new venue rules follow Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 116 “fairly closely” but failing to grasp the consequence of the deviation
from Rule 116); Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its
Structure, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Procedure, 11 ST. MARY’S L.J. 251, 297 (1979) (explaining the
new language of section 1472 but failing to appreciate the significance of the shift from Rule 116(a));
Lawrence P. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107 (1979) (failing
to mention the changes to the venue rules); Kenneth N. Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 64
A.B.A. J. 1865 (1978) (failing to mention the changes to the venue rules); Martin I. Klein, Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (1979) (noting that there are “new venue provisions” but
failing to explain the significance of the changes); Arthur L. Moller, Chapter 11 of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Happened to Good Old Chapter XI?, 11 ST. MARY’S L.J. 437 (1979)
(failing to mention the changes to the venue rules); Donald Lee Rome, The New Bankruptcy Act and
the Commercial Lender, 96 BANKING L.J. 389 (1979) (failing to mention the changes to the venue
rules).
52
LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 38 (2005).
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53

Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 —though the applicable section was
renumbered as § 1408. Since its 1978 enactment, the language of the
bankruptcy venue rules is substantially unaltered.
The 1978 changes simplified the venue rules by providing one section
that covers all debtors. However, this consolidation has brought the debate
regarding venue full circle. By forcing individual and corporate debtors
under the same provision, the terms “domicile” and “residence”—concepts
ill-suited for corporate debtors—are back in a provision governing such
debtors.54
Exploring the genesis of the venue rules in bankruptcy furthers an
understanding of corporate debtors’ ability to forum shop but not whether
such parties are actually doing so. In fact, some skeptics argue that forum
shopping in bankruptcy is vastly overstated—a phenomenon that peaked
many years ago.55 This argument is empirically false.

53
Pub L. No. 98-353, § 102, 98 Stat. 333, 334 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006)). For reasons
outside the scope of this Article, venue is actually placed with the district courts, rather than the
bankruptcy courts. This fact has no material effect on the discussion herein.
54
Proponents of the current venue rules have frequently argued that the history of the bankruptcy
venue statute indicates conscious and definitive support for permissive rules. See REPORT OF THE
DELAWARE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TO THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION IN
SUPPORT OF MAINTAINING EXISTING VENUE CHOICES 6–7 (1996) (discussing the history of the
bankruptcy venue statute); see also Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011: Hearing on
H.R. 2533 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law, 112th Cong. 24–25 (2011)
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2533] (statement of David Skeel, Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School) (discussing the history of the bankruptcy statute and the need for permissive
rules). More specifically, these proponents argue that, except for a brief five-year period from 1973 to
1978, corporate debtors have always been allowed to file in their state of incorporation. Thus, the
argument goes, any change to the current venue rules would overturn a long-standing provision and
practice. This argument indicates a profound misunderstanding. The history of the bankruptcy venue
statute actually argues against allowing a corporate debtor to rely on its state of incorporation in
selecting venue. As explained, Congress only affirmatively endorsed a corporate debtor’s state of
incorporation as a basis for venue in 1934, and that decision was promptly repudiated in 1938. See
supra text accompanying notes 29–33. From 1938 to 1978, state of incorporation was not a basis for
venue for corporations with publicly held debt or securities, though it remained a basis for other types
of business organizations. In referencing the history of bankruptcy venue provisions prior to 1978,
proponents of the current permissive venue rules focus on venue provisions that affected natural
persons or corporations that had no publicly held debt or securities. But the forum shopping
phenomenon currently affecting the bankruptcy system involves publicly held corporations, not natural
persons or other types of business organizations. This incongruence is overlooked and perpetuates a
fundamental misunderstanding regarding the history of the bankruptcy venue provisions. Ultimately,
as will be explored further in this Article, the history of the bankruptcy venue statute does not support
recognizing state of incorporation as a basis for a corporate debtor’s venue choice.
55
See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2533, supra note 54, at 25 (opining that the case for repudiation of
the tradition allowing corporations to file for bankruptcy in their state of incorporation is not
undeniable or overwhelming).

2013]

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

173

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN
FORUM SHOPPING PHENOMENON
Professor Lynn M. LoPucki is credited with not only identifying the
problem of forum shopping56 in bankruptcy but also providing key
empirical data that substantiated the phenomenon. In 1991, LoPucki and
Professor William Whitford explored the concept of forum shopping in
bankruptcy.57 Their article presented an empirical study of the bankruptcy
reorganizations of the forty-three largest publicly held companies that filed
between 1979 and 1988.58 The study found that a “substantial number” of
cases had forum shopped, with the bankruptcy court in the Southern
District of New York often being the forum of choice.59 In subsequent
years, LoPucki continued to explore this area of law.60 His research
culminated with his 2005 book Courting Failure,61 which attempted to
explain and quantify the forum shopping problem.
More than twenty years have passed since Professors LoPucki and
Whitford’s seminal article on forum shopping, and eight years have passed
since the release of the controversial book Courting Failure. The
bankruptcy filings sparked by the Great Recession provide ample data that
is useful for understanding new trends in this field and warrant a
reconsideration of the forum shopping phenomenon.
I analyzed data aggregated by Professor LoPucki and conducted my
own empirical research to determine whether forum shopping is still a
systemic issue in bankruptcy and, if so, what statutory bases are supporting
the practice.
A. The Data and Methodology
In 1994, Professor LoPucki created the UCLA-Bankruptcy Research

56

For a detailed definition of “forum shopping,” see supra note 9.
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9.
58
Id. at 12.
59
Id.
60
See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999)
(seeking to explain the pattern of forum shopping); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are
Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002)
(reporting the results of a study designed to confirm that New York’s and Delaware’s higher refiling
rates indicate higher failure rates and inquiring into the reasons for those failure rates); Lynn M.
LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:
Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001) (concluding that the
excessive rate of bankruptcy filings by emerging companies appears to be the product of wasteful
competition among courts); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993) (providing
information for others to use in their evaluation of the success of chapter 11).
61
LOPUCKI, supra note 52.
57

174

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:159

62

Database (the “BRD”). The BRD includes data on all bankruptcy cases
filed by or against public companies in the United States bankruptcy courts
since October 1, 1979.63 Court files and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filings represent the source of most of the data, while
some information is pulled from newspaper accounts, newsletters,
company websites, and surveys.64 BRD generally analyzes the location of
a company’s headquarters and the venue of its reorganization case to
determine instances of likely forum shopping.65 Professor LoPucki
allowed me to review data for all 159 public debtors66 (i) with
62
Today, access to the BRD’s data can be requested online. Request Download, UCLA-LOPUCKI
BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/request_download.htm (last visited Aug.
30, 2013). Many scholars have disagreed with Professor LoPucki’s conclusions and methodologies.
See, e.g., Harvey Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1987, 1997 (2002) (“The LoPucki and Kalin theory is flawed. . . . Consistent failure rates in New York
and Deleware, two venues that attract the most sophisticated and complex organizations, indict the
reorganization process, not the courts.”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt, 2007 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 179, 229–30 (“Locating the driving force behind LoPucki’s empirical claims in only a
subset of the cases thus renders his empirical assertions unreliable.”); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall
S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate
Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 285–86 (2001) (“LoPucki and Kalin have looked at one type
of capital restructuring after an initial reorganization—a second bankruptcy—but have neglected to
scrutinize the reasons why a large number of firms, well over half, dropped out of their study.”); Robert
K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent
Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1389 (2000) [hereinafter Rasmussen & Thomas, Timing
Matters] (“Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki fail to consider the choices that debtors’ attorneys face
when advising their clients on where to file.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About Delaware?,
54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 314 (2001) [hereinafter Skeel, What’s so Bad About Delaware?] (“LoPucki and
Kalin further complicate matters by equating the Delaware premium in corporate law with troubled
firms’ decision to file for bankruptcy in Delaware rather than elsewhere, as if the two are completely
interchangeable.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and
Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1277 (2000) (“[LoPucki’s] argument that a federal framework
cannot be subject to local variation is in some respects the most puzzling, as it seems to assume a
hyper-formalist definition of law.”). But I have found no party criticizing the data found in the BRD.
My empirical study relied on the data found in the BRD, along with the data I collected to reach my
own independent conclusions.
63
LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at xi; see also Contents of the BRD, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR.
RESEARCH DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/contents_of_the_webbrd.htm (last visited Aug. 30,
2013). The BRD recognizes a company as “public” if it was required to file annual reports with the
SEC in any of the three years before filing a bankruptcy petition. LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at xi. Note
that the cases included in the BRD are not a mere sample of bankruptcy cases filed in the United States.
Id.
64
Frequently Asked Questions, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE,
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/Frequently_asked_questions.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).
65
See
Glossary,
UCLA-LOPUCKI
BANKR.
RESEARCH
DATABASE,
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/glossary.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (describing the BRD’s definition
of forum shopping).
66
A number of debtors filed two qualifying bankruptcy cases. In these instances, both cases were
counted. For example, Movie Gallery, Inc. filed a bankruptcy case in 2007 and emerged from
bankruptcy in 2008. Movie Gallery filed another bankruptcy case in 2010. Jonathan Stempel, Movie
Gallery
Files
Bankruptcy
to
Shut
805
Stores,
REUTERS
(Feb.
3,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/03/us-moviegallery-idUSTRE61232U20100203.
The
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approximately $1.2 billion or more in assets (“Megacases”), and (ii) that
filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter 11 between January 1, 2007 and
June 30, 2012.
Further, for the 159 corporate debtors in my study group, I also
independently reviewed these debtors’ bankruptcy petitions and first-day
motions. By doing so, I sought to accomplish two goals. One, I sought to
provide additional certainty to any forum-shopping determination that had
been made by the BRD. But, more importantly, I also sought to compile
meaningful data regarding the primary bases on which forum shoppers
relied. In my research, I was unable to find any previous attempt to collect
and classify this type of data. In effect, I was attempting to isolate the
means of forum shopping. To accomplish this, I started by reviewing the
bankruptcy petition for each debtor in the study group.
A bankruptcy petition compels a debtor to provide insight into its
venue choice. As detailed in Part IV, the bankruptcy venue rules arguably
provide four primary bases for establishing venue in a district: (1) the
debtor’s principal assets in the United States are located in the district; (2)
the debtor’s principal place of business in the United States is located in
the district; (3) the debtor is incorporated in the state in which the district is
found; or (4) a case concerning an affiliate of the debtor is pending in the
district. In filling out its bankruptcy petition, a corporate debtor must
check at least one of three boxes to disclose the basis for its venue choice.
The first box groups three of the four bases listed above and provides that
the chosen district is proper based on the debtor’s domicile, residence,
principal place of business, or principal assets.68 The second box provides
that the chosen district is proper because there is a pending case of the
debtor’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership in the same district.69 The
third box involves foreign proceedings.70
To the extent that a corporate debtor in my study group had checked
the first box, I reviewed its first-day motions to determine whether the
basis was: (i) state of incorporation; (ii) location of principal place of
business; or (iii) location of principal assets. I recorded this information,
and it helped me determine on which bases forum shoppers were most
frequently relying.
If the debtor had based its venue choice on its state of incorporation, I
cases were counted as separate cases for purposes of this study. See infra notes 315–16 and
accompanying data.
67
The BRD captures all cases filed by or against public companies that reported assets of $500
million or more (measured in 1980 dollars; just over $1.2 billion in 2007 dollars) on the last form 10-K
that the debtor filed with the SEC before filing the bankruptcy case.
68
U.S.
BANKR.
COURT,
FORM
B1,
at
2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Current/B_001.pdf.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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reviewed the debtor’s bankruptcy filings to determine whether the debtor
had any other meaningful connection to the state of incorporation, through
either its business holdings or operations. If there was none, I deemed that
debtor to have forum shopped.
If the debtor had based its venue choice on the location of its principal
place of business, I evaluated whether the debtor’s purported principal
place of business was really its headquarters and whether the headquarters
had conveniently been moved at any point during the 6 months prior to the
bankruptcy filing in order to secure venue in a particular district. If either
of these factors existed without an accompanying business justification, the
debtor was deemed to have forum shopped.
If the debtor had based its venue choice on the location of its principal
assets, I evaluated what those assets were, the value of the assets in relation
to the value of assets the debtor held in different districts, and how long
those assets had been located in the district. A debtor was deemed to have
forum shopped when the assets upon which a debtor relied in securing
venue were merely bank accounts and (i) the debtor had no other
meaningful connection to the district; and (ii) other considerable assets
were located in another district. Further, a debtor was deemed to have
forum shopped if the assets, regardless of type, located in the selected
venue were significantly less valuable than the assets located in another
district.71
Finally, to the extent that a corporate debtor had selected the second
box, which indicated an affiliate filing, I reviewed its first-day motions to
understand the timeline of its filing. It is important to keep in mind that the
fact that the debtor files in the same district in which an affiliate’s
bankruptcy case is already pending does not necessarily mean that the
debtor is forum shopping. In some cases, only the most troubled company
in a corporate family files for bankruptcy. But in subsequent months or
years, the rest of the enterprise is forced to follow suit. The value in
adjudicating all these cases before the same court is clear and
uncontroversial. Yet most cases that rely on an affiliate filing hook to
secure venue do involve forum shopping.
Two criteria facilitate
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate reliance on an affiliate
filing hook: (1) the value of the affiliate’s assets in comparison to the
debtor’s assets; and (2) the timing of the two filings.
71
In attributing value, I used both a qualitative and quantitative evaluation approach. I reviewed
the stated value of the assets in question as well as the perceived importance these assets had to the
debtor’s business and rehabilitation prospects. For example, if the corporate debtor in question was a
casino operator, a vacant lot with a high market value would be deemed less qualitatively important to
the debtor than its flagship casino, even to the extent that the market value of the land was considered
to be higher than the casino. However, my quantitative evaluation would properly weigh the market
value of the land if it was considerably greater than that of the casino.
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In the vast majority of cases where corporate debtors are seeking to
forum shop in reliance on an affiliate filing hook, the affiliate’s assets are
minuscule in comparison to the debtor’s—the tail is essentially wagging
the dog. The other indicator of forum shopping is that the corporate debtor
filed its bankruptcy case hours, sometimes minutes, after its affiliate
filed.72 I deemed cases in which both of these criteria existed to be the
product of forum shopping. Invariably, the primary corporate debtor could
not secure the venue it sought based on § 1408’s other venue bases and did
not wish to file in a natural forum. The debtor, therefore, located a
subsidiary that could secure the desired venue. All the necessary
bankruptcy filing work was done for the entire corporate family, but the
subsidiary was filed first to secure venue, and then the rest of the
companies were filed.
My extensive research and analysis, along with information available
through the BRD, allowed me to determine which of the 159 cases in my
study group had forum shopped and on which basis they had relied. The
results were surprising.
B. The Results
The forum shopping phenomenon that Professors LoPucki and
Whitford exposed in 1991 was amplified during the Great Recession. My
analysis of the BRD data reveals that from 1991 to 1996, 55% of
Megacases had forum shopped.73 From 2007 to 2012, 69% of Megacases
had forum shopped.74 Further, the absolute number of cases of forum
shopping increased. There were eighty-eight Megacases from 1991 to
1996 and forty-eight of those corporate debtors forum shopped.75 From
2007 to 2012, there were 159 Megacases and 110 of those corporate
debtors forum shopped.76 Consequently, between these two periods, the

72
A good example is In re Station Casinos, Inc., No. BK-09-52477 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 21,
2011), which I will speak to from my first-hand experience. In that case, the primary debtor entities
owned casinos valued at over a billion dollars. But the debtor’s subsidiary, Northern NV Acquisitions,
LLC, filed first. The subsidiary owned only a small parcel of land in Reno, but this asset was sufficient
to secure venue in the Northern Division of Nevada. Within a matter of minutes after the Northern NV
Acquisition’s filing, the primary debtor entities were filed based on an affiliate’s pending case. This
mechanism allowed the debtor to avoid filing in its natural forum, the Southern Division of Nevada,
which has bankruptcy judges that some corporate debtors view unfavorably.
73
See UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, supra note 62 (resulting data and notes on
file with author).
74
See infra Appendix (showing that 110 of the 159 corporate debtors in my study group had
forum shopped).
75
UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, supra note 62 (data and notes on file with
author).
76
See infra Appendix. As noted earlier, the BRD attempts to equalize the valuation of
bankruptcy cases by converting all asset figures into 1980 dollars. See supra note 67. So a 1991
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frequency with which Megacases forum shopped grew at a statistically
significant rate (14%), and the absolute number of Megacases that forum
shopped grew at a staggering rate (130%).
For the cases filed from 1991 to 1996, the average number of
employees for each debtor that forum shopped was approximately 6,500.77
For the cases filed from 2007 to 2012, the average number of employees
for each debtor that forum shopped was approximately 9,400—a 45%
increase.78 This data establishes that during the Great Recession,
significantly more corporations with far more employees filed for
bankruptcy and, of those corporations, nearly seven out of ten forum
shopped. As the size of these cases increases, so do the liabilities, the
number of creditors affected, and the collective exposure of the secured
and unsecured creditor bodies. Thus, there are far more parties affected by
the large-asset bankruptcy cases filed during the Great Recession and the
forum shopping in which these corporate debtors engaged.
In addition, as demonstrated in Figure 1 below, the data I
independently gathered provides deeper insight into the basis on which
these debtors relied in filing in their selected venue.
FIGURE 1
PORTION OF CORPORATE DEBTORS WHO FORUM SHOPPED
(BY VENUE BASIS) 79

bankruptcy case with a reported asset valuation of $900 million would qualify as a “Megacase” for
purposes of my study, but a 2007 case with the same asset valuation would not.
77
UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, supra note 62 (data and notes on file with
author).
78
See infra Appendix.
79
See infra Appendix (listing individual pieces of supporting case data).

2013]

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

179

As discussed, there are four independent bases for filing a bankruptcy
petition in a given district.80 Figure 1 shows that 114 of the 159 corporate
debtors in my study group checked the box on their bankruptcy petition
indicating that they were filing in the district of their incorporation or the
location of their principal business or assets. However, only five of these
debtors relied on the location of their principal assets, and all of them
forum shopped. Fifty-six of the 159 corporate debtors in my study group
(35%) relied on the location of their principal place of business to establish
venue, and eight of them (15%) forum shopped. Fifty-three of the 159
corporate debtors in my study group (33%) relied on their state of
incorporation in securing venue. All fifty-three of these corporate debtors
forum shopped, and fifty of them (94%) filed in Delaware.81 The
remaining forty-five corporate debtors of the 159 corporate debtors in my
study group (28%) relied on an affiliate filing hook, and forty-four of those
forty-five corporate debtors forum shopped. Thirty-six of those forty-four
debtors (82%) filed in either Delaware or the Southern District of New
York.82
Therefore, 97 of the 98 corporate debtors that relied on their state of
incorporation or the affiliate filing hook (the “Forum Shopping Bases”) to
establish venue had forum shopped and, of this group, almost nine out of
ten forum shopped to either Delaware or the Southern District of New
York.83 Further, by stepping back and looking at all 110 forum shoppers in
my study group, we see that nearly nine out of ten forum shoppers relied
on one of the two Forum Shopping Bases to forum shop.84 Additionally,
out of all forum shoppers in my study group, eight out of ten filed in either
Delaware or the Southern District of New York.85 Ultimately, the two
Forum Shopping Bases overwhelmingly provide the means by which
parties are forum shopping (see Figure 2 below), and Delaware and the
Southern District of New York are the courts where these forum shoppers
are invariably landing (see Figure 3 below).

80

See supra text accompanying note 68.
See infra Appendix (identifying the district where each case was filed).
82
See infra Appendix (noting that eight filed in Delaware and twenty-eight filed in the Southern
District of New York).
83
See infra Appendix (showing that eighty-six of the 97 forum shoppers in my study group (89%)
relied on either the state of incorporation venue basis or the affiliating filing hook filed in either
Delaware or the Southern District of New York).
84
See infra Appendix (showing that ninety-seven of the 110 forum shoppers in my study group
(88%) relied on either the state of incorporation venue basis or the affiliate filing hook to forum shop).
85
See infra Appendix (showing that ninety-one of the 110 forum shoppers in my study group
(82%) filed in either Delaware or the Southern District of New York).
81
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FIGURE 2
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Finally, 100 of the 159 cases in my study group (63%) filed in either
Delaware or the Southern District of New York.88 Even putting aside the
forum shopping issue, the fact that these many Megacases are
accumulating in just two courts indicates some sort of market irregularity.
Indeed, all bankruptcy courts are governed by the same federal law.89
Naturally, case law can vary from circuit to circuit depending on precedent
in a particular circuit and local rules, but key decision makers reacting to
case law would conceivably lead to the accumulation of cases in a
particular circuit, not in a particular court.90
The data indicate a market failure. The phenomenon Professors
LoPucki and Whitford identified in 1991 continues to plague the
bankruptcy system.
IV. HOW CORPORATE DEBTORS USE THE PERMISSIVE
VENUE RULES TO FORUM SHOP
Section 1408 in title 28 of the United States Code provides the venue
rules for bankruptcy cases filed under title 11.91 The section allows
individual and business entities to commence a bankruptcy case in the
district court for the district:
(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of
business in the United States, or principal assets in the United
States, of the person or entity that is the subject of such case
have been located for the one hundred and eighty days
immediately preceding such commencement, or for a longer
portion of such one-hundred-and-eighty-day period than the
domicile, residence, or principal place of business, in the
United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such
person were located in any other district; or
(2) in which there is pending a case under title 11 concerning
such person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership.92
For a corporate debtor, § 1408 arguably provides four primary bases
for establishing venue in a district: (1) the debtor’s principal place of
business in the United States is in the district; (2) the debtor’s principal
assets in the United States are located in the district; (3) the debtor is
88

See infra Appendix.
LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at 77. Some variance exists based on local rules and other courtspecific procedures. Id. at 77–78.
90
Id.
91
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006). Cases
ancillary to foreign bankruptcy proceedings are filed under chapter 15 of title 11 and governed by
§ 1410’s venue rules. Id. § 1410.
92
Id. § 1408.
89
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incorporated in the state in which the district is found; or (4) a case
concerning an affiliate of the debtor is pending in the district.
A. Principal Place of Business
In establishing venue, fifty-six of the 159 corporate debtors in my
study group (35%) relied on their principal place of business; eight of them
forum shopped.94 The corporate debtors in my study group utilized this
basis for establishing venue more than any other, but only 14% of them
relied on this basis to forum shop.95
The location of a debtor’s principal place of business is a question of
objective fact, not subjective intention, to be resolved after considering
relevant aspects of the debtor’s operations.96 The overarching question
involves where the debtor, in the aggregate, manages and initiates its
business.97 Two primary tests are used to answer this question. The
“nerve center” test advocates a more limited inquiry,98 and instructs courts
to look to the place where the debtor’s “major, business management
decisions are made. Under [this test], wherever the debtor’s primary
decision-makers are congregated will be the principal place of business.”99
In other words, the corporate headquarters and offices are invariably the
principal place of business.100 The “operational” test probes further.101
This test evaluates the debtor’s day-to-day operations, considering not just
where major business management decisions are made but also the location
of: (i) the debtor’s books, records, accounting, and other management
information; (ii) personnel, equipment, and assets; (iii) income generating
activities and where debts were incurred; (iv) bank accounts; and (v) day-

93
Many states have multiple districts in which a debtor can file. Geographic Boundaries of the
United States Court of Appeals and United States District Courts, USCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). For instance,
California has four districts and multiple bankruptcy courts within each district. California Bankruptcy
Court Directory, CALIFORNIABANKRUPTCY.INFO, http://www.californiabankruptcy.info/court.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2013). Thus, under § 1408, a debtor incorporated in California can file in any one
of the four districts based on its place of incorporation.
94
See supra Figure 1.
95
Id.
96
E.g., In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 150 F.3d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he principal
place of business inquiry is primarily a factual one.”); In re Condor Exploration, LLC, 294 B.R. 370,
374 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (“[W]hat constitutes the principal place of business of a corporation is a
question of objective fact, not subjective intention.”).
97
See, e.g., In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 795 (arguing the principal place of business “is
likely to be the place where its management decisions are made”); In re Condor Exploration, 294 B.R.
at 374 (providing factors to determine an entity’s principal place of business).
98
In re Condor Exploration, 294 B.R. at 374.
99
Id. (citing In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 788).
100
Id.
101
Id.
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102

to-day activities.
The Supreme Court recently shed some light on the debate between
these two tests. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend,103 the Court sought to resolve a
circuit split concerning the meaning of the phrase “principal place of
business” provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) for purposes of determining
whether federal diversity jurisdiction exists.104 Some courts had employed
the nerve center test, focusing on the place from which a corporation’s
officers direct the corporation’s activities.105 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, along with other courts, had adopted the more complex “business
activity” or operational test that focused on the place where the greater
share of a corporation’s executive and administrative functions are
performed.106 The Court resolved the split in favor of the nerve center test,
a choice that the Court believed would engender greater administrative
simplicity.107 Indeed, the Court explained that the “[principal place of
business] should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its
headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of
direction, control, and coordination . . . and not simply an office where the
corporation holds its board meetings.”108 The Court found that the
operational test was too complex and forced judges to consider a variety of
criteria and “weigh corporate functions, assets and revenues different in
kind, one from the other.”109 The Court concluded that the test led to
inconclusive decisions—needlessly complicating cases, fostering disputes
and appeals, eating up time and money, and ultimately diminishing “the
likelihood that results and settlements [would] reflect a claim’s legal and
factual merits.”110 The Court believed that the nerve center test would
“point[] courts in a single direction, towards the center of overall direction,
control, and coordination[, making it] a sensible test that [would be]
relatively easier to apply.”111
The Hertz ruling does not foreclose discussion on the definition of the
principal place of business. Courts prior to the Hertz ruling noted that
differing policy considerations suggest that “tests for a corporation’s
principal place of business in diversity cases should not be imported
wholesale into bankruptcy venue law.”112 Nevertheless, notwithstanding
102

Id.; In re Dock of the Bay, Inc., 24 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
559 U.S. 77 (2010).
104
Id. at 80.
105
Id. at 80–81.
106
Id. (citing Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500–02 (9th Cir. 2001)).
107
Id. at 92–93.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 90–92, 96.
110
Id. at 94.
111
Id. at 95–96.
112
In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 206 B.R. 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (7th Cir. 1998) (citing
In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 1247 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979)), aff’d, 150 F.3d 788.
103
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the differing policy objectives between § 1332 and § 1408, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of “principal place of business” in § 1332 must
inform any interpretation of the identical phrase in § 1408.113 The Hertz
ruling, for all intents and purposes, mandates the nerve center test in
evaluating a corporation’s principal place of business. This means that
corporate defendants have less flexibility in arguing diversity under
§ 1332, and corporate debtors have slightly less flexibility in attempting to
justify their choice of venue under § 1408.
B. Principal Assets
Of the four primary venue bases, the location of a corporate debtor’s
principal assets is invoked the least. While only five of the 159 corporate
debtors in my study group (3%) relied on the location of their principal
assets in establishing venue, all five forum shopped.114
The term “assets” is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code but has been
interpreted broadly115 to include not only manufacturing facilities,
inventory, and equipment, but also rights under a lease or sublease, shares
of stock, accounts receivable, net operating losses, and pending lawsuits,
inter alia.116 In evaluating this basis for venue, courts will be considering
those assets that are principally used in the operation of the debtor’s
business.117 To be considered, the assets must be related to business in
which the debtor is engaged.118 Bankruptcy courts will generally engage in
Note that § 1332 and § 1408 have differing policy objectives. Diversity jurisdiction was designed to
“provide a separate forum for out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries
by making available to them the benefits and safeguards of Federal courts.” S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4
(1958). Supreme Court precedent in this area has often sought to limit a corporation’s ability to
manufacture diversity and improperly remove cases to federal court. The language of § 1408 serves
not to protect debtors from local courts and local juries, but to allow flexibility in choosing venue. The
policy concerns guiding these two sections have “little or nothing in common.” In re Commonwealth
Oil, 596 F.2d at 1247 n.17.
113
See In re Lakota Canyon Ranch Dev., LLC., No. 11-03739-8-RDD, 2011 WL 5909630, at *1
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 21, 2011) (citing the Hertz ruling and adopting the nerve center test in
determining principal place of business), as amended (June 23, 2011); In re W. Coast Interventional
Pain Med., Inc., 435 B.R. 569, 575 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2010) (same).
114
See supra Figure 1.
115
See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) (defining property of the estate as “all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).
116
See In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (including net operating
losses as part of bankruptcy property); In re Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 474 B.R. 122,
135–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (including rights under a lease as bankruptcy assets); In re J & L
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 186 B.R. 388, 390 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (including accounts receivable as
bankruptcy assets).
117
See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 19 (describing how companies will move their
headquarters in order to obtain a favorable venue).
118
See In re Newport Creamery, Inc., 265 B.R. 614, 616 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that in
order to establish proper venue, the principal place of business or principal assets must be in the
district).
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a quantitative and qualitative analysis.
A quantitative analysis requires
that a court consider the dollar value of the assets in relation to value of the
debtor’s overall portfolio of assets.120 A qualitative analysis requires that a
court consider the importance of the assets to the debtor’s operations and
reorganization prospects.121 Only one district can qualify as the place
where a company’s principal assets are located.122 Therefore, the
bankruptcy courts will often have to compare the assets located in one
district with those located in another.123
Not coincidentally, this criterion also tends to be the one that is the
most difficult to manipulate. Large corporations invariably have assets
located in a variety of districts; moving or selling a portion of these assets
in order to establish venue in a given district could be difficult and
unnecessary considering the other venue bases available. That being said,
because of the broad reading of the term “assets,” this basis affords
corporations with less fixed assets significant flexibility.
C. Place of Incorporation and the Unresolved Quandary
1. The State-of-Incorporation Venue Basis Affords Corporate Debtors
Significant Flexibility
A corporate debtor’s place of incorporation represents a venue basis
that is both frequently used and facilitates forum shopping. One-third of
the corporate debtors in my study group relied on this basis, and all fiftythree forum shopped.124 Further, these fifty-three forum shoppers represent
almost half of the total number of forum shoppers in my study group.
Section 1408 of title 28 provides that a “person” can rely on domicile
or residence in selecting venue.125 Section 1 of title 1 of the United States
Code defines the term “person” to include natural persons as well as
fictitious business entities, such as partnerships and corporations.126 A
natural person can clearly have a domicile and a residence. “Residence” is
generally where someone is living. “Domicile” is generally understood to
119

See In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (using both quantitative and qualitative analyses).
See id. at 135–36 (emphasizing the importance of properly identifying a debtor company’s
principal assets, to allow for a useful numerical comparison with the company’s overall assets).
121
Id. at 136.
122
See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 17 (stating a debtor can only have one principal
place of business at any given time).
123
See In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (determining whether venue was appropriate by
comparing the assets of the holding company to those of its subsidiaries that were within different
districts).
124
See supra Part III.B.
125
11 U.S.C § 1408 (2012).
126
See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”)
120
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refer to the place where one resides coupled with the intention to remain;
the term can also refer to the place where one intends to return.127
However, the language of § 1408 indicates that these terms can also
conceivably apply to a corporate debtor. Though it is unclear how a
corporation could have a “domicile” or “residence” aside from its
corporate headquarters or location of principal assets, many courts assume
that a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation.128 In these
jurisdictions, corporate debtors have immense flexibility. A corporation’s
state of incorporation can be changed relatively easily.129 Changing a
corporation’s state of incorporation to secure venue may be worthwhile in
cases involving a limited number of high-stakes issues in which the court
before which the bankruptcy case is tried may be dispositive. Furthermore,
a corporate debtor is generally seen as having the right to file in any district
located within its state of incorporation. Consequently, this basis for venue
is allowing forum shopping not only among circuits and states but also
among districts within the same state.
The only real constraint on a corporate debtor relying on its state of
incorporation is that it must have been incorporated in the state of its
bankruptcy case for the 180 days immediately preceding its filing or, in the
alternative, the longer portion of such a period.130 But considering that the
vast majority of Megacases involve months and sometimes years of prebankruptcy negotiations, the 180-day look-back period poses a minor
obstacle.
2. Questionable Assumptions Regarding the Meaning of “Domicile”
The premise that a corporate debtor can rely on its state of
incorporation as a basis for venue is virtually unquestioned. But the
foundation for this practice is unclear. As noted above, Congress
originated this approach in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. The act grouped
together all debtors, whether they were natural persons or fictitious
business entities, and afforded the same bases for establishing venue to
each. In drafting this legislation, Congress overlooked the fact that while
127

In re Donald, 328 B.R. 192, 202 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., In re EB Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 11-12646(MG), 2011 WL 2838115, at *3 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (“A corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of incorporation.”);
In re Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating a corporation’s
domicile is its state of incorporation); In re Innovative Commc’n Co., LLC, 358 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2006) (“Venue is appropriate in the state of incorporation.”); In re FRG, Inc., 107 B.R. 461,
471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[A] corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of
incorporation.”); In re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (finding Delaware to
be a proper venue since the debtor was incorporated in that state).
129
See, e.g., Alison Torbitt, Implementing Corporate Climate Change Responsibility: Possible
State Legislative and SEC Responses to Climate Change Through Corporate Law Reform, 88 OR. L.
REV. 581, 595 (2009) (stating a business can easily change its state of incorporation).
130
28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).
128
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the terms “domicile” and “residence” clearly applied to natural persons, the
application to corporate debtors was unorthodox.
The judiciary was tasked with handling this oversight. Many courts
ruled that a corporation’s “domicile” indicated its state of incorporation,
implicitly finding that the term “residence” could not apply to a corporate
debtor and certain language in the section could be disregarded to the
extent it compelled such a result.131 As noted above, in 1938, Congress
ultimately rejected this approach for corporate debtors that had publicly
held securities or debt. Based on the National Bankruptcy Conference’s
clear policy rationale, Congress limited venue for such corporate debtors to
the location of their principal place of business or principal assets.132 In
1973, the judiciary fully endorsed this approach.133
Nevertheless, unfortunate drafting decisions plagued § 1408 and
§ 1475, its predecessor, and Congress reincarnated the same troublesome
venue problem to which it had given birth in 1898. While the decision to
reintroduce the terms “domicile” and “residence” to corporate debtors may
have been a gross oversight, it represents only the first step. As noted
above, at the time the current venue rules were enacted, venue provisions
had not been abused. Legislators and academics had uniformly overlooked
the potential for abuse created by the changes to the rules. But this
potential was first realized by a 1988 Delaware bankruptcy court ruling.134
In 1988, the Delaware and Hudson Railway Company filed a chapter
11 bankruptcy petition in Delaware Bankruptcy Court.135 The company’s
corporate headquarters and virtually all of its assets were in Albany, which
was located in the area governed by the Northern District of New York
Bankruptcy Court.136 The company had essentially no connection to
131
See, e.g., In re Pilgrim Plumbing Supply Corp., 123 F. Supp. 823, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (“[I]t
is clear that a corporation has its domicile in the place where it is incorporated.”); In re Triton Chem.
Corp., 46 F. Supp. 326, 328 n.1 (D. Del. 1942) (“As both alleged bankrupts are Delaware corporations,
they are ‘domiciled’ in this district.”); In re R.C. Stanley Shoe Co., 8 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D.N.H. 1934)
(“[A] corporation may be organized under the laws of one state and have its principal place of business
in another state and there be jurisdiction in both states to adjudge the corporation a bankrupt.”).
132
See supra Part II.B.
133
See supra Part II.B.
134
Some courts reached the same conclusion before Delaware did. The court in In re HME
Records, Inc., 62 B.R. 611, 613 n.3 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986), indicated in dicta that state of
incorporation could serve as a basis for venue. The bankruptcy court in In re Spicer Oaks Apartments,
Ltd., 80 B.R. 142, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987), also stated in dicta that state of incorporation could
serve as a basis for venue. The court in In re Coalfield Development, Inc., 56 B.R. 201, 203 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1986), considered the debtor’s state of incorporation in evaluating the principal-place-ofbusiness prong under the venue rules. And the bankruptcy court in In re Community Churches of
America, 57 B.R. 562, 564 n.2 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1986), stated unequivocally that a corporation’s
domicile is its state of incorporation. These rulings were far less impactful since relatively few large
corporate debtors are incorporated in these states as compared to Delaware.
135
In re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 467, 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988).
136
Id.
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Delaware aside from the fact that it was incorporated there.
The New
York State Department of Transportation sought to transfer the case to
New York.138 Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Helen S. Balick denied
the request, stating that venue in Delaware was appropriate because the
debtor was incorporated in that state.139 Surprisingly, Judge Balick
provided absolutely no rationale or explanation for her interpretation of
§ 1408. The opinion does not even explain whether a corporate debtor’s
state of incorporation is considered under the “domicile” or “residence”
prong or perhaps some other basis.140 Judge Balick’s opinion promotes
this basis for venue as an uncontroversial option; an axiomatic practice
without need for citation. Judge Balick reiterated her interpretation of
§ 1408 just two months later in In re Ocean Properties of Delaware, Inc.141
Again, she offered no explanation or rationale for her reading of the
section.142
These two rulings, along with rulings in other jurisdictions,143 offer an
interpretation of § 1408 that is unsupported by legislative history or the
language of the statute.144 The only explanation for this interpretation
137
See id. at 468 (describing the debtor’s assets, the majority of which were not connected with
Delaware).
138
Id. at 467.
139
Id. at 467, 469.
140
This is just one of the many flaws in the opinion. For example, despite the debtor’s
overwhelming connections to New York, Judge Balick denied the transfer motion, ruling that the
debtor’s choice of forum was entitled to “great weight,” and that Delaware would be “most convenient
from the standpoint of accessibility” for some of the constituents in the case. Id. at 467–68. In making
a decision on a motion for a change of venue, courts generally examine the following factors: “(1) the
location of the debtors’ estate; (2) the economic and efficient administration of the debtors’ estate; (3)
the proximity of the debtors; (4) the proximity of the creditors; (5) the proximity of the witnesses . . . .”
In re Old Delmar Corp., 45 B.R. 883, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Judge Balick’s decision to allow the
perceived accessibility of the Delaware court to trump all other factors is extraordinary. Further, Judge
Balick fails to provide any explanation or citation for her belief that the debtor’s choice of venue is
entitled to “great weight.”
141
95 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988).
142
From a purely economic perspective, Judge Balick’s interpretation was practically
preordained. Indeed, 89% of the large public companies that filed for bankruptcy reorganization from
1980 to 1997 were incorporated or had a subsidiary that was incorporated in Delaware. Eisenberg &
LoPucki, supra note 60, at 985. Judge Balick’s ruling allowed all of these debtors to file in Delaware.
A contrary ruling would have precluded essentially all of these debtors from doing so. In light of the
amount of revenues large bankruptcy cases infuse into local communities, such a ruling would have
been clearly against the interests of the Delaware legal and business communities.
143
See, e.g., In re EB Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 11-12646(MG), 2011 WL 2838115, at *3 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (finding a corporation to be domiciled in its state of incorporation); In re
Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (recognizing that a corporation’s
state of incorporation is proper for venue); In re Innovative Commc’n Co., LLC, 358 B.R. 120, 125
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“Venue is appropriate in the state of incorporation.”); In re FRG, Inc., 107 B.R.
461, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating a corporation is domiciled in its state of incorporation).
144
Note that § 304 of the 1984 Bankruptcy Code dealt with the recognition of foreign bankruptcy
proceedings by U.S. bankruptcy courts. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005). The section contained
language similar to § 1408 and appeared to apply the term “domicile” to corporate entities. The section
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requires analogizing to extremely old jurisdiction cases. Indeed, courts
interpreting the 1898 Bankruptcy Act’s confusing venue provisions relied
on two Supreme Court cases in finding that a corporation could have a
domicile. In the first case, Bank v. Earle,145 the Court was faced with the
question whether a corporation chartered in one state could be legally
bound by a contract entered into in another state.146 The Court held that a
corporation could be legally bound by a contract entered into in a state in
which it was not chartered.147 In dicta, the Court stated that “[i]t is very
true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of
the sovereignty by which it is created . . . . It must dwell in the place of its
creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.”148 The support that
this dicta provides for a finding that “domicile” equates to a corporate
debtor’s state of incorporation is unclear.
The second case, Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co.,149 involved the question
of federal diversity jurisdiction and required the Court to determine
whether a corporation chartered under Michigan law but doing business in
New York was present in New York within the meaning of a diversity
statute requiring suit to be brought in a state where the defendant was an
“inhabitant” or was “found.”150 In holding that a corporation could be sued
only in the state and district in which it was incorporated or in the state of
which the other party is a citizen, the Court noted that the “legal existence,
the home, the domicile, the habitat, the residence, the citizenship of the
corporation can only be in the state by which it was created, although it
may do business in other states whose laws permit it.”151 Once again, the
efficacy of relying on dicta in a jurisdiction case from the nineteenth
century is unclear.
More recent opinions rely on these cases but also analogize to
28 U.S.C. § 1391, the venue statute for civil litigation.152 There are two
primary problems with this reference. First, § 1391 explicitly provides that
it applies only to a corporation that is a defendant in a civil action;153 this is
clearly not the case in a bankruptcy proceeding. Furthermore, § 1391 does
not state that a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation. Rather,
was drafted at the same time as § 1475, the predecessor to § 1408. However, § 304 was repealed in
2005, and the key provision was completely rewritten, removing the term “domicile” from the inquiry.
145
38 U.S. 519 (1839).
146
Id. at 585.
147
Id. at 588–89.
148
Id. at 588.
149
145 U.S. 444 (1892).
150
Id. at 447.
151
Id. at 450.
152
See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. S.F.C. Corp., 702 F.2d 282, 283 (1st Cir. 1983) (deciding the case on
the issue of venue, and noting a corporate plaintiff is a resident only in the state in which it is
incorporated for venue purposes).
153
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006).
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§ 1391 provides that for purposes of determining proper venue, a
corporation’s “residence” is its state of incorporation.154 The section
makes no mention of “domicile.” As noted above, bankruptcy courts have
uniformly agreed that the term “residence” does not apply to corporate
debtors.
The basis for finding that the term “domicile” applies to corporate
debtors and indicates state of incorporation is questionable. Even the most
generous reading of the key opinions in this area fails to uncover
persuasive arguments. Not surprisingly, various courts have rejected
Delaware’s interpretation of § 1408 and found that neither “domicile” nor
“residence” can apply to a corporate debtor.155
Ultimately, the issue is unresolved, but this fact has limited effect. The
Delaware courts allow corporate debtors to rely on their state of
incorporation in establishing venue. This decision facilitates forum
shopping and is unaffected by the lack of consensus on whether the
interpretation is justified.
D. Affiliate Filing
The final basis for a corporate debtor’s venue choice is that one of the
debtor’s “affiliates” has a pending case in the district.156 This basis and the
154
Section 1391 provides that a corporate defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which the corporation is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction—which has been interpreted to
include the corporation’s state of incorporation. E.g., VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1577–79 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
155
See In re Condor Exploration, LLC, 294 B.R. 370, 373 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (rejecting
Delaware’s interpretation of § 1408); In re Indus. Pollution Control, Inc., 137 B.R. 176, 180 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1992) (same); In re Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 133 B.R. 562, 563–64 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1991) (same); In re Suzanne de Lyon, Inc., 125 B.R. 863, 866 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); see also
In re EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc., 178 B.R. 57, 62 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (acknowledging uncertainty
regarding whether the terms “domicile” and “residence” apply to corporate debtors).
156
See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2006) (stating that a title 11 case can be brought in a district “in
which there is a pending case under title 11 concerning such person’s affiliate”). Though not
technically binding, § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “affiliate” to mean:

A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20
percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an
entity that holds such securities—(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole
discretionary power to vote such securities; or (ii) solely to secure a debt, if such
entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote; (B) corporation 20 percent or
more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity that directly or
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that holds such
securities—(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to
vote such securities; or (ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact
exercised such power to vote; (C) person whose business is operated under a lease or
operating agreement by a debtor, or person substantially all of whose property is
operated under an operating agreement with the debtor; or (D) entity that operates
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state-of-incorporation basis work together to facilitate forum shopping.
Forty-five of the 159 corporate debtors in my study group (28%) relied on
the affiliate filing hook. Forty-four of the forty-five debtors forum
shopped. Further, 40% of the forum shoppers in my study group relied on
this basis.
Surprisingly, this venue basis was traditionally one of the least
controversial provisions of the venue rules. Without this basis for venue,
various companies within the same corporate family could be forced to file
for bankruptcy in different districts. A wholesale adjudication of the
corporate family’s bankruptcy cases would be virtually impossible. There
would be considerable waste of judicial resources, not to mention the
financial and logistical burden on the debtor’s officers and legal counsel.
The net result would be a significant reduction in any chance of a
meaningful reorganization. Notwithstanding this sound policy, § 1408(2)’s
wording provides virtually no restrictions on an affiliate filing, and this has
allowed for debtor gamesmanship.
Today, § 1408(2) is used in a manner that bears no relation to the
policy basis of the provision. As noted in Part III.A, the most common
method for abusing this provision is for the corporate debtor to locate a
subsidiary that had been incorporated in a favorable district—a district in
which the primary corporate debtor could not otherwise file its bankruptcy
petition. Legal counsel for the corporate debtor prepares the entire
corporate family for bankruptcy. But instead of filing the entire family
together, legal counsel files the subsidiary’s petition in the favorable
district first to establish venue. Then, within a matter of minutes, the rest
of the corporate family files their bankruptcy petitions in the same district
on the premise that an affiliate’s bankruptcy case is pending in the district.
Despite this obvious gamesmanship, none of the forty-four forum shopping
cases I identified was transferred.
Debtor gamesmanship can come in other permutations. In some cases,
a corporate family has no subsidiaries that are able to file in the desired
district. This is a rare circumstance—and was not present for any of the
corporate debtors in my study group—but one that is easily circumvented
because of the permissive language of § 1408(2). In such a case, the
company merely creates and incorporates a shell subsidiary in the
favorable district and then follows the procedure outlined above. The shell
subsidiary has no employees or meaningful operations or assets, but the
fact that it is incorporated in the favorable district is sufficient—even when
the incorporation occurs in the days immediately before the bankruptcy
the business or substantially all of the property of the debtor under a lease or
operating agreement.
11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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157

filing.
Once again, nothing in the venue rules restricts such blatant
gamesmanship.
E. The Problem
The controversy with the current venue rules is not that they allow
corporate debtors to file in Delaware or New York, but rather that
corporate debtors have the option of filing just about anywhere. This
flexibility creates a troubling dynamic. To the extent that the bankruptcy
judges in the magnet districts of Delaware and New York fall out of favor
with the key decision makers, cases can easily start to accumulate in some
other jurisdiction. Megacases are seldom filed without an extended
interval of out-of-court negotiations. These negotiations usually last
months, sometimes over a year, and are held in the shadow of a chapter 11
filing. Consequently, as these negotiations progress, decision makers are
already planning where to file and can easily change states of
incorporation, move assets and offices, or make other maneuvers to
facilitate a filing in their chosen district. These are the consequences of
permissive venue rules. But what is the harm?
V. THE HARM OF FORUM SHOPPING
Once the history, basis, and frequency of forum shopping are
established, the debate leads to the harm, perceived or actual, of forum
shopping. The harm from forum shopping is a convoluted issue because
the practice in bankruptcy is unique from that which exists in customary
civil litigation. The primary differences stem from corporate debtors’
incentives and control over venue and the high forum shopping rate that
exists in bankruptcy.

157
Debtors have attempted to use this technique in many instances. See In re Dunmore Homes,
Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that debtor’s only connection to New York
was its incorporation in the state on the eve of bankruptcy); United States Trustee’s Omnibus Reply to
Objections to United States Trustee’s Motion, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
1014(a), to Transfer Venue of These Cases in the Interest of Justice at 6–7, In re Patriot Coal Corp.,
482 B.R. 718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (No.12-12900) (arguing that the debtors’ chief financial officer
essentially admitted to incorporating two affiliates in the weeks before the bankruptcy filing for the sole
purpose of establishing venue in the Southern District of New York); Motion of Buffalo Rock
Company to Transfer Venue of the Debtors’ Bankruptcy Cases to the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division or Such Other District Where Venue Would
Be Appropriate Under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 at 6, In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., No. 05-11063 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2005) (explaining that debtor had incorporated an affiliate just twelve days before
the bankruptcy filing in order to secure venue in the Southern District of New York). But see
Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee’s Motion, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a)(1), to Transfer Venue of These Cases in the Interest of Justice, In re Patriot
Coal, 482 B.R. 718 (No.12-12900) (arguing that case should not be transferred pursuant to the court’s
rationale in Winn-Dixie).
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A. The Incentive to Forum Shop
Forum shopping encompasses a number of strategic practices. In
bankruptcy, the term is the by-product of outcome maximization in at least
one of three distinct areas. Appreciating corporate debtors’ different
motivations for forum shopping is necessary because not all manner of
forum shopping is negative.158
Primarily, corporate debtors and other key decision makers159 are
shopping for favorable law. As is the case in almost any legal dispute,
forum shoppers in bankruptcy are acutely aware of variance in substantive
law between circuits and even courts within the same circuit.160 Not
surprisingly, some of these differences can alter the disposition of a
bankruptcy case. In fact, from circuit to circuit, there exists a significant
variance in bankruptcy law on case-defining issues.161 This fact forces
158
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the value of some types of forum shopping.
Supreme Court jurisprudence has only attempted to foreclose one type: that which occurs in diversity
cases and results from substantive law differences between federal and state courts in the same state.
See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 368 (2006) (discussing the importance
of forum shopping). However, bankruptcy is exclusively a product of federal law, and the key aspects
of the process are overseen exclusively by the federal courts. There is no forum shopping in
bankruptcy that could implicate federalism concerns, at least as to the issues within this Article’s
purview.
159
Any discussion of incentives must recognize that a debtor’s forum selection choice is often
times dictated by secured creditors and equity sponsors. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 651–53 (2010) (discussing incentives). Naturally,
these outside third parties hold leverage in many instances and have their own incentives in guiding a
case to one venue over another. Nevertheless, we can generally describe the incentives of the key
decision makers in this area because their objectives are usually a poorly kept secret.
160
See Forum Shopping, First Day Orders, and Case Management Issues in Bankruptcy, 1
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 515, 516–17 (2003) (statement by panelist Richard M. Cieri, Partner at
Kirkland & Ellis) (discussing some of practitioners’ perceived differences between circuits).
161
For example, corporate debtors needing to assume key non-assignable executory contracts
under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) will avoid the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, which have adopted the
hypothetical test for assumption. See In re Catapult Entm’t, 165 F.3d 747, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1999); In
re W. Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83–84 (3d Cir. 1988) (disallowing assignment of executory contracts
that are key and non-assignable); In re Catron, 158 B.R. 629, 633 (E.D. Va. 1993) (disallowing
assignment of executory contracts that are key and non-assignable), aff’d 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam). Corporate debtors seeking to modify terms or entirely reject collective bargaining
agreements may seek to avoid the Third Circuit. See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United
Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1093 (3d Cir. 1986) (disallowing modification or rejection of collective
bargaining agreements). Corporate debtors that expect to seek third party releases under its plan of
reorganization will most likely avoid the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See In re Lowenschuss, 67
F.3d 1394, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1995) (disallowing a third party release); In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746,
760–01 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 601–02 (10th Cir. 1990)
(same). Executives and other key decision makers concerned about the bankruptcy court appointing a
chapter 11 trustee because of executive malfeasance may seek to avoid the First Circuit. See Tradex
Corp. v. Morse, 339 B.R. 823, 830–32 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that a party seeking the appointment of
a trustee needed to make the necessary showing by a preponderance of the evidence). Instead, they
may file in either the Second Circuit or the Third Circuit. See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217,
1226 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that a party seeking the appointment of a trustee must make the necessary
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corporate debtors and other key decision makers to consider aggressive
actions in order to control the venue of their bankruptcy cases.
Secondly, corporate debtors and other key decision makers are
particularly sensitive to the perceived experience, knowledge, and
personality of the judges in any given district. This flows from a general
understanding that “[i]n a large Chapter 11 case, judges have a great deal
of discretion in applying the Bankruptcy Code.”162 For example, the
exercise of this discretion is frequently seen in a number of prominent,
case-altering matters including the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements, “debtor in possession financing terms, lift stay motions,
[requests to use] cash collateral and [myriad] valuation disputes.”163
showing by clear and convincing evidence); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 336 B.R. 610, 655–56
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same). Constituencies concerned about the bankruptcy court reclassifying
their debt as equity contributions will attempt to persuade the debtor to file in the Ninth Circuit. See In
re Pac. Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (being unfriendly towards an action to
reclassify debt as equity). Or, at the very least, a constituency concerned about the court reclassifying
debt as equity will not file in the Sixth Circuit. See Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r. of Internal
Revenue, 800 F.2d 625, 629–32 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding a haphazard reclassification of debt as
equity on appeal). Corporate debtors intent on selling substantially all of their assets in the initial days
of the bankruptcy case may seek to file in the Second Circuit. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063,
1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing a debtor’s right to sell substantially all of its assets through a 11
U.S.C. § 363 asset sale if there is a good business reason); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 493
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (allowing the debtor to sell substantially all of its assets through a 11 U.S.C. §
363 asset sale conducted the month following the petition date). Corporate debtors intent on
discharging CERCLA obligations will avoid the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. See Waterville
Indus., Inc. v. First Hartford Corp., 124 B.R. 411, 414 (D. Me. 1991) (refusing to discharge a CERCLA
obligation as a matter of course); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 838–39 (D.
Minn. 1990) (disposing of the motion to discharge a CERCLA obligation unfavorably); United States
v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (refusing to discharge a
CERCLA obligation). Counsel for a corporate debtor concerned about potential conflicts of interest
affecting its approval as debtor’s lead counsel may avoid the Seventh Circuit. See In re Envirodyne
Indus., Inc., 150 B.R. 1008, 1021 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (enforcing conflict of interest law justifiably
and rigorously). Corporate debtors intent on making payments to critical vendors for prepetition claims
will avoid the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004)
(refusing to pay vendors for prepetition claims); In re Oxford Mgm’t, Inc., 4 F.3d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir.
1993) (refusing to pay vendors for prepetition claims, not even critical ones); In re Coserv, LLC, 273
B.R. 487, 501 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (disallowing prepayment of incredibly critical vendors in
prepetition claims). Constituencies concerned about a prepetition leveraged buyout being attacked as a
fraudulent transfer will attempt to persuade the debtor to file in the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, or
Tenth Circuits. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329, 347 (2d
Cir. 2011) (refusing to classify something as a fraudulent transfer); In re Plassein Int’l Corp., 590 F.3d
252, 254 (3d Cir. 2009) (classifying a transfer as non-fraudulent); In re QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d 545,
551 (6th Cir. 2009) (classifying a transfer as non-fraudulent); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564
F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2009) (accepting the prepetition leveraged buyout as non-fraudulent); In re
Kaiser Steel Corp., 952 F.2d 1230, 1238–39 (10th Cir. 1991) (accepting the prepetition leveraged
buyout as non-fraudulent). Or, at the very least, they will adroitly avoid the Eleventh Circuit. See In re
Munford, Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 613–14 (11th Cir. 1996) (deciding a prepetition leveraged buyout was
fraudulent).
162
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 717.
163
Id.
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Therefore, in compiling a list of possible venues for a bankruptcy case,
debtor’s counsel is often tasked with reviewing each bankruptcy judge in
each available district; opinions will be evaluated, comprehensive judicial
assessments by independent third parties reviewed,164 and practitioner
assessments aggregated.165 Key decision makers will classify and rank
each bankruptcy judge based on her actual or perceived position on key
issues facing the corporate debtor and its constituencies. This exacting
process serves to assist counsel to corporate debtors and other key decision
makers in formulating venue decisions. Specifically, corporate debtors and
other key decision makers will be looking to (i) avoid a district in which
one or more of the bankruptcy judges are deemed to be unfavorable; (ii)
gain access to a district where there is only one bankruptcy judge, and that
judge is deemed to be favorable;166 or (iii) gain access to a district where
the likelihood of getting an unfavorable judge is deemed to be small
enough to warrant filing in the district.
Finally, the less familiar form of forum shopping in bankruptcy
involves forum shoppers who are drawn to a district for perceived
procedural/administrative benefits. These benefits include court practice,
services and procedure, local rules, and even the role of the local Office of
the United States Trustee (the “UST Office”). Some proponents of the
current venue rules have argued that certain districts have more efficient
procedures and practices and the search for efficiency fuels procedure
shopping.167 But it is unlikely that efficiency is the overriding concern.
Efficiency lacks value if it negatively affects a debtor’s outcome
maximization. In reality, many local rules strongly favor corporate debtors
by creating timelines and procedures that inhibit dissent. Further, among
its many functions, the UST Office monitors the fees charged by attorneys
and other professionals for services they render to the debtor and certain
other parties in interest.168 Different offices service different districts and
164

For a commonly used reference guide, see ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Aspen

2012).
165
See Forum Shopping, First Day Orders, and Case Management Issues in Bankruptcy, supra
note 160, at 519 (statement by panelist Richard M. Cieri, partner at Kirkland & Ellis) (“[W]hen we are
preparing a case for a Chapter 11 filing, we will actually prepare a chart that will look at each of the
districts . . . . [and] reflect how various legal issues may be determined by the court.”).
166
For example, for many years when I practiced, the Honorable Gregg Zive was the sole
bankruptcy judge in the unofficial “Northern Division” of the District of Nevada. During his time on
the bench, Judge Zive was reputed to be a knowledgeable and effective jurist. Many corporate debtors
sought to file in Judge Zive’s division, even if it was not a natural forum.
167
See, e.g., Skeel, What’s So Bad About Delaware?, supra note 62, at 325 (arguing the search for
efficiency motivates forum shopping).
168
See U.S. Trustee Program, About the Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/index.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (clarifying that a specific
responsibility of UST offices is “[e]nsuring that bankruptcy estates are administered promptly and
efficiently, and that professional fees are reasonable”).
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each one has a unique policy for reviewing and objecting to fees. Debtor’s
counsel will oftentimes advise clients to avoid a district that is overseen by
a UST Office that frequently objects to fees and successfully forces
professionals to significantly reduce their bills. Counsel to secured
creditors or equity sponsors that have enough leverage to veto this
preference will often times defer on this issue.
It is worthwhile to note that information pertaining to these three
primary motivations for forum shopping is efficiently disseminated by
corporate bankruptcy attorneys in a manner unparalleled outside of
bankruptcy. Indeed, a small pool of law firms are involved in the venue
decision for the vast majority of high-profile bankruptcy cases. I reviewed
forty-four of the largest bankruptcy cases from 2000–2012169 and compiled
a list of each debtor’s lead counsel.170 Either (i) Weil Gotshal, (ii)
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, (iii) Kirkland & Ellis, or
(iv) Sidley Austin was lead counsel in twenty-five of the forty-four
cases.171 Put differently, one of these four firms was lead bankruptcy
counsel in 57% of the largest cases filed in the first twelve years of this
century.
This small pool of repeat players facilitates efficient
dissemination of public and private information about bankruptcy courts,
judges, and substantive and procedural trends. Consequently, courts can
easily fall out of favor based on one ruling that key decision makers or
their counsel find distasteful.172
B. The Harm of Forum Shopping
Forum shopping is a fixture of court-adjudicated dispute resolution and

169
This review was conducted using data from the BRD. See supra notes 62–63, and
accompanying text. Accompanying notes to support the remainder of this section are on file with the
author.
170
“Lead counsel” means the firm retained to represent the debtor under section 327(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. In many cases, more than one firm was retained. In these instances, the firm
without an office in the filing district was deemed the lead counsel because the firm with the office in
the filing district was serving as local counsel.
171
Weil Gotshal was debtor’s lead counsel in eight cases. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
was debtor’s lead counsel in eight cases. Kirkland & Ellis was debtor’s lead counsel in five cases. And
Sidley Austin was debtor’s lead counsel in four cases.
172
This was the case for the bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Illinois based on a circuit
court ruling in In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004). The bankruptcy court had
allowed the debtor in that case to make certain controversial payments to critical vendors. Id. at 868–
69. This decision was appealed and ultimately overturned by the Seventh Circuit, which explained that
the bankruptcy court had been too compliant to the debtor’s wishes and created a basis for relief that
actually did not exist in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 869. This decision caused the Northern District of
Illinois to fall out of favor with subsequent corporate debtors who felt that making such payments
would be vital to a successful reorganization. See LOPUCKI, supra note 49, at 166 (discussing such
payments).
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173

defended by scholars.
Nevertheless, in customary civil litigation, a
number of statutes, court rules, procedures, and principles work together to
discourage the practice.174 Unfortunately, these safeguards do not apply in
bankruptcy or are ineffectual due to the unique characteristics of
bankruptcy cases.175 This discrepancy leads to one significant point that
general scholarship on this issue overlooks: the harm of forum shopping
correlates with the frequency of the practice. As noted above, seven out of
ten corporate debtors in my study group forum shopped. At this frequency
level, the practice predominates, and the harmful effects manifest.
Primarily, rampant forum shopping undermines the perception and
integrity of the bankruptcy system. When high-profile bankruptcy cases
repeatedly flee to one of two bankruptcy courts, the process appears to be
manipulable.176 The perception is that there are courts willing to give
corporate debtors and other key decision makers the outcomes they seek.
And, due to a lack of rules governing the venue choice, a debtor can simply
choose the court that is most flexible. This impression erodes public
confidence in the bankruptcy courts and affects creditors, employees,
unions, and other constituents excluded from the perceived backroom
dealings. An attendant problem is that the fairness of the bankruptcy
system is also called into question. The court system strives to ensure that
similarly situated parties receive similar treatment. Forum shopping leads
to disparate treatment.
Further, an abnormally elevated level of forum shopping creates a
173
See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a
Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 81 (1999) (defending forum shopping as a realistic way to select a venue);
Bassett, supra note 158, at 339 (applauding choice of law as the engine that drives much of
contemporary forum shopping); Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong With That?, 24
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 50 (2005) (stating that many rules govern forum shopping); Rasmussen &
Thomas, Timing Matters, supra note 62, at 1358 (promoting forum shopping by insolvent
corporations).
174
See Maloy, supra note 173, at 50 (delineating a variety of statutes, rules of civil procedure,
judge-made rules, and legal principles).
175
The most obvious characteristics are (i) corporate debtors—the presumptive defendant in any
other civil context—choose venue; (ii) bankruptcy cases progress at a staggering speed; and (iii) the
bankruptcy venue rules are so permissive that ex post means of curtailing forum shopping are
ineffective.
176
Just a few examples include (i) the Los Angeles Dodgers, despite their name and location of
assets and key personnel, filing in Delaware, In re Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, 465 B.R. 18, 22 (D. Del.
2011); (ii) GM and Chrysler, the quintessential Michigan companies, filing in the Southern District of
New York, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); (iii) Washington Mutual,
despite its extensive West Coast operations and lack of East Coast branches, filing in Delaware, In re
Wash. Mut., Inc., 421 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); (iv) American Airlines, the Dallas-based
company, filing in the Southern District of New York, In re AMR Corp., 491 B.R. 372, 375 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2013); (v) MGM, the famous Hollywood studio and entertainment company, filing in the
Southern District of New York, In re Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 459 B.R. 550, 551 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010); and (vi) Delta Airlines, one of the preeminent companies in Atlanta, filing in the
Southern District of New York, In re Delta Air Lines, 342 B.R. 685, 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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unique problem. Federal trial courts are incubators for legal discourse. “A
cornerstone of our judicial system is that the law be subject to a variety of
interpretations at the trial level.”177 Significant disagreement at the trial
level will often prompt circuit court review, and disagreement at the circuit
court level will often prompt Supreme Court review. “But when a few
judges, by virtue of sitting in desirable venues, are the only judges to
review certain issues, the system breaks down.”178 Without discourse, the
review process ceases. In effect, the bankruptcy judges in New York and
Delaware, the magnet courts, are making bankruptcy law. More
specifically, the oversubscription to the magnet courts is due, at least in
part, to corporate debtors’ forum shopping. Forum shoppers are voicing
their approval of certain courts’ interpretation of key bankruptcy issues
and, in many cases, are voicing their disapproval of how other courts have
interpreted the same issues. But the interpretations of these magnet courts
may be inaccurate—too debtor or debtor counsel friendly. Without
discourse across bankruptcy courts, these inaccuracies remain
unchallenged and are actually strengthened by repeated application to a
long string of cases.
Finally, cases pooling in just two districts is inefficient. The magnet
court judges are overburdened while judges in other courts are
underutilized.179 Overburdened judges must carefully allocate their time,
and any misallocation will negatively affect judicial performance and the
accuracy of rulings.180
As noted above, the harm of forum shopping correlates with the
frequency of the practice. Outside of bankruptcy, the frequency of forum
shopping is at a rate that allows for a spirited debate regarding the
perceived harm. But Megacases forum shop at a staggering rate—a level
at which the negative effects of forum shopping are concentrated. Debate
must shift from a discussion of the harm to an exploration of possible
solutions.

177

NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 782.
Id.
179
Simply appointing more judges to the magnet courts is not necessarily a viable solution. A
single ruling could cause a magnet court to fall out of favor with key decision makers and lead to cases
pooling in another, perhaps under-staffed, district.
180
Though outside the scope of this article, there are a number of secondary consequences of
forum shopping that other scholars have propounded, including (i) higher failure rates for reorganized
companies filing in the magnet courts, LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 60, at 233, (ii) the propensity of
some bankruptcy judges to issue debtor-friendly rulings to secure high-profile cases for certain
districts, LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at 246, and (iii) the inability of small creditors and employees to
actively participate in a bankruptcy case because the case is filed in a distant, inconvenient venue,
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 776–78.
178
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VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: A MULTIFACETED APPROACH TO A
MULTIFACETED PROBLEM
In the following section, I propose a variety of solutions that, if
implemented, will significantly diffuse the harm caused by forum shopping
in bankruptcy. My objective in making these proposals is not to eliminate
all forms of forum shopping but to merely install some basic boundaries
and limitations. The empirical data establish that nine out of ten forum
shoppers in my study group relied on either the state-of-incorporation
venue basis or the affiliate filing hook. Consequently, my proposed
solutions focus on these two venue bases and fall into one of three
umbrella categories: (1) changes to the bankruptcy venue statute;
(2) changes to bankruptcy procedure; and (3) changes to a fundamental
structural element of our bankruptcy court system.
A. Changes to the Bankruptcy Venue Statute
Changing the venue statute that facilitates forum shopping is the most
effective method for addressing the harm caused by the practice. Any
discussion of changing the venue rules should begin by acknowledging that
§ 1408’s ambiguous language precludes uniform interpretation and
undermines bankruptcy policy. Bankruptcy courts adjudicate cases
involving natural persons and fictitious entities.181 But these two groups
are fundamentally distinct, and one comprehensive venue provision will
invariably fail. There must be unique and separate treatment for these
debtors. Further, my empirical research establishes that the state-ofincorporation venue basis and the affiliate filing hook are providing the
means by which parties forum shop. Therefore, the first step is to
eliminate § 1408 as it currently exists and return to the language of Rule
116.
I propose a new section 1408(a)(1) titled “Natural Persons.” The new
section would state that a petition filed by or against a natural person182 can
only be filed in a district where the individual has had her domicile,
residence, or principal place of business for the 180 days immediately
preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such 180-day
period than the domicile, residence, or principal place of business of such
person were located in any other district.
I further propose a new section 1408(a)(2) titled “Corporations.” The
new section would state that a petition filed by or against a corporation
may be filed only in the district where the corporation has had its principal

181
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2012) (defining “person,” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, as
an “individual, partnership, and corporation”).
182
The term “natural person” will need to be added to the defined terms under title 1.
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place of business or its principal assets for the 365 days immediately
preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such 365-day
period than the principal place of business, in the United States, or
principal assets in the United States, of such corporation were located in
any other district.184
In addition to these changes, a new section 1408(a)(4) would replace
current § 1408(2) and the affiliate filing basis. The new section 1408(a)(4)
would provide that a person can file a bankruptcy petition in a district in
which there is a currently pending case concerning such person’s affiliate,
general partner, or partnership, as long as such person has a “meaningful
connection” to the district. The requirement that the corporate debtor have
a “meaningful connection” to the district should curtail the most blatant
forms of forum shopping. The use of the word “meaningful” would
compel the debtor to show by a preponderance of the evidence that its
business and/or operations establish some material relationship to the
chosen district; at the same time, “meaningful” would demand a far less
rigorous showing than words such as “substantial” or “predominant.” The
term would be undefined in the Bankruptcy Code.185 This approach would
allow the judiciary to develop the most effective definition of the term. To
the extent that a judge determines that the debtor in question fails to
establish a meaningful connection to the district in question, then the case
may be transferred to another district pursuant to Rule 1014(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.186
183
I believe that the current 180-day period is insufficient to truly address debtor gamesmanship.
As noted above, the vast majority of Megacase filings are preceded by many months of out-of-court
restructuring negotiations. I believe that stretching the evaluation period to 365 days will more
effectively mitigate forum shopping.
184
Section 1408(a)(3) should also be added and address venue for partnerships and potentially
governmental units.
185
Though the term would be undefined, the statute would need to specify that the fact that the
chosen district is located within a state in which the corporate debtor is incorporated would not, by
itself, establish a “meaningful connection.”
186
“If a petition is filed in an improper district, the court, on the timely motion of a party in
interest or on its own motion, . . . may . . . transfer [the case] to any other district if the court determines
that transfer is in the interest of justice . . . .” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(2). At least some corporate
debtors will argue that under these new rules, a scenario could unfold where a venue dispute consumes
the initial days of a bankruptcy case—days that are unquestionably vital for a corporate debtor to
secure the initial relief it needs to successfully reorganize. I agree that this risk exists, but I do not
think this risk in any way undercuts the need for these rules. Indeed, the venue of a “megacase” is a
substantial issue. According to Richard M. Cieri, a partner at Kirkland & Ellis, prior to a bankruptcy
filing, debtor’s counsel will spend a significant amount of time and resources evaluating this issue. See
Forum Shopping, First Day Orders, and Case Management Issues in Bankruptcy, supra note 160, at
519 (discussing counsel’s evaluation of the different jurisdictions in which bankruptcy petition may be
filed). My proposed changes place the onus on corporate debtors to file its case in good faith and after
careful deliberation. The ability to access all the remedial benefits of the Bankruptcy Code—benefits
that are oftentimes wholly unavailable outside of bankruptcy—should require that corporate debtors
fulfill certain basic obligations. In many respects, far more is expected from individual consumer
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B. Changes to Bankruptcy Procedure
I also advocate changes to bankruptcy procedure that would support
the proposed changes to the venue statute. Primarily, I suggest that the
bankruptcy petition used by all debtors should be revised. Currently, in
establishing venue, debtors are asked to choose one of three boxes.187 The
first box is to be checked if the debtor’s venue choice is based on its
domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets. The
second box is to be checked if the debtor’s venue choice is based on the
filing district of an affiliate. The last box is to be checked if the debtor is
involved in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. I believe that the venue box
should be revised so that a debtor must affirmatively state which specific
section 1408 basis supports its venue choice; having four venue bases
grouped together is inappropriate. Further, each corporate debtor should
be obligated to file a separate form that briefly explains why the chosen
venue is appropriate. This additional requirement would facilitate a court’s
review of the propriety of the venue choice.
There is currently no instruction to bankruptcy court judges to verify
that a debtor’s chosen venue is proper. As it presently stands, courts
presume that the debtor’s venue choice is appropriate.188 A party that
objects to the venue choice must file a transfer motion and bears the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer of
the case is warranted.189
I propose that this burden should initially be on the debtor. Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1014(a) should be modified to provide that
courts must verify the propriety of the debtor’s venue choice at the outset
of the case or as soon as practicable.190 Concurrently, 28 U.S.C. § 1292
should be amended to provide that a ruling on venue is to be considered

debtors who must satisfy a variety of strict requirements to gain access to the bankruptcy courts. My
proposed changes merely place similar obligations on corporate debtors. To the extent that a corporate
debtor engages in forum shopping, it runs the risk of facing logistical and legal hurdles that could
severely undermine its reorganization prospects. Arguably, most key decision makers will refuse to
pursue courses of conduct that can expose the corporation to oversized risk. Under my changes, as key
decision makers move away from venue gamesmanship, the integrity of the legal system would be
enhanced, and the results for the vast majority of constituencies would improve.
187
See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
188
See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 327, 342 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A debtor’s choice of
forum is entitled to great weight if venue is proper.”).
189
Id.
190
The rest of Rule 1014(a) can remain unchanged because it flows naturally after the added
language. Subdivision (1) addresses the instance where a case is filed in a proper district but parties in
interest still request a transfer of venue, while subdivision (2) addresses the instance where a case is
filed in an improper district. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a).
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interlocutory and appealable by any party in interest.
Naturally, the
importance of first-day hearings for Megacases cannot be overstated.
These hearings allow the debtor to secure financing and other relief vital
for transitioning into bankruptcy and preserving any hope of a successful
reorganization. The relief corporate debtors seek in these hearings cannot
be stalled while a ruling on venue is appealed, and they need not be.
Bankruptcy judges can rule on the debtor’s first-day motions and grant the
appropriate relief necessary for the debtor to begin operating as a debtor in
possession subject to the fact that the case could be transferred to another
court.192 In most cases, these orders will merely provide interim relief for
some finite period of time; this is done to allow unsecured creditors and
other parties in interest the opportunity to appear and object to any of the
relief granted.
To fashion a viable system for appeals of venue rulings that would not
significantly disrupt the current system of first-day orders, an appeal of a
venue ruling under my proposed changes would be directly appealable to
the appropriate circuit court of appeals.193 The customary filing timelines
would need to be truncated. A party appealing a venue ruling would have
a limited number of days to file its notice of appeal and appellate brief.
Reply briefs would be due a short time after, and the appropriate appellate
court would perform an expedited review.194 In the event that venue is
found to be improper, the bankruptcy court, pursuant to Rule 1014(a)(2),
would decide exactly when and where to transfer the case “under [a
flexible] timetable that minimizes . . . the harm to the creditors and other
stakeholders” in the case.195
191
Presently, subsection (a) of this statute only speaks to interlocutory orders and decrees in
matters of injunctions, receiverships, and the determination of rights and liabilities in admiralty cases.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2006).
192
See In re Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 474 B.R. 122, 139 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(noting the court’s agreement to transfer an improperly venued case but only after granting certain
forms of relief to avoid significant disruption to the debtor’s reorganization prospects).
193
28 U.S.C. § 157 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001 will need to be modified to
effectuate this change. The former discusses the interplay between district and bankruptcy courts as to
referrals and withdrawals of matters under the Bankruptcy Code, 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006), while the
latter addresses the procedure for appealing final and interlocutory judgments, orders, or decrees of
bankruptcy judges, FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001.
194
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002 through 8009 provide the basic deadlines for
appealing a bankruptcy court order, specifically as to filing notices, motions for leave, designations of
record items and issues presented, and briefs. FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002–09. The timelines established
by these rules and any attendant local rules would need to be truncated.
195
In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 137. As previously stated, at least some corporate debtors
will argue that this provision could threaten a debtor’s reorganization prospects. I agree that this
possibility exists, but I reiterate that I do not believe that this risk in any way undercuts the need for the
change. Once again, these changes are placing the onus on corporate debtors to file their cases in the
appropriate venue. To the extent that venue is questionable, a debtor runs the risk of suffering
significant disruption during the initial weeks of its case. Ultimately, venue rules and procedures

2013]

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

203

I also advocate for a modification of Rule 1014. Subsection (a)(2)
currently provides that if a case is filed in the improper district the
bankruptcy court “may” transfer the case.196 The provision should be
modified so that transfer is mandatory in instances where a case is filed in
the improper district unless transfer would cause irreparable damage to the
estate.
Finally, under the new rules and procedures outlined above, counsel
seeking to engage in aggressive gamesmanship with a client’s venue
decision would run the risk of causing significant disruption to her client’s
reorganization prospects. The deterrence effect from these proposed
changes is clear, though potentially insufficient to deter the most egregious
conduct. Key decision makers may be willing to risk excessive harm to a
corporate debtor’s reorganization prospects if filing in a particular district
can be personally beneficial.197 Under the new rules and procedures
outlined above, a significant portion of the harm from aggressive
gamesmanship could be externalized. Therefore, bankruptcy courts should
be explicitly authorized to award sanctions for reckless forum shopping.
Arguably, bankruptcy judges already have the power to award such
sanctions under Rule 9011.198 But Rule 9011(b) should be modified to
explicitly provide that by filing in a specific district, debtor’s counsel is
making a representation that there is a sound basis supporting that
decision.199 To the extent that representation turns out to be erroneous, a
bankruptcy judge should have the option of sanctioning a debtor’s lead and
local counsel.200 The sanction would be limited to the reasonable
attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred by any party that brought a
transfer motion or otherwise contested the venue choice.

should not be drafted to insulate debtors from the fact that gamesmanship comes with inherent risks
and consequences.
196
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(2).
197
For example, this would be the case for executives who have engaged in corporate
malfeasance and fear the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee who may aggressively investigate
prepetition activities.
198
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 addresses representations to the court and
sanctions. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. As reflected in the accompanying notes of the Advisory
Committee on Rules, this rule is modeled after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
addresses these same subjects. See FED. R. BANK. P. 9011 advisory committee’s note (stating that the
rule is meant to “conform to F.R.C.P. 11”).
199
Presently, Rule 9011(b) only requires that attorney representations are put forth with a proper
purpose, are not frivolous, and are supported by evidence in the record. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
200
Sanctioning the insolvent debtor would be pointless because that would invariably serve as a
sanction on the unsecured creditors of the debtor’s estate—–a party that generally has no input in the
venue decision. Sanctioning corporate executives would also be pointless as these executives typically
have directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance policies that invariably cover such penalties. The threat
of penalizing these executives would not necessarily deter gamesmanship.
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C. Changes to Bankruptcy Court Structure
The previous sections offer a number of proposals that should curtail
the most harmful forum shopping practices in bankruptcy. My proposals
focus on the venue rules and procedures associated with filing a
bankruptcy case. My final proposal is unprecedented and seeks to effect
change by altering the very structure of the bankruptcy courts.
A significant number of corporate debtors and other key decision
makers are motivated by the promise of favorable law. To the extent that
the law on significant issues is uniform across circuits, one primary
incentive to forum shop is mitigated. Only Congress and the Supreme
Court can act to impose this sort of uniformity. Unfortunately, Congress
has demonstrated neither the inclination nor the ability,201 and the Supreme
Court arguably does not have the docket capacity to effectuate this type of
change. A similar problem plagued patent law in the 1970s. Congress’s
solution to that problem could benefit the bankruptcy system.
Prior to 1982, the regional federal appellate courts handled appeals of
all district court patent rulings.202 Unfortunately, the appellate courts
oftentimes exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of patent law’s
technical complexity, and rulings across circuits lacked uniformity and
undermined the patent system.203 Indeed, there was a wide disparity in the
way circuits treated patents. And the Supreme Court, it seems, did not
have the docket capacity to take on the number of cases necessary to
resolve this schism. The lack of uniformity created a scenario where the
venue of a patent dispute could, by itself, determine if a patent would be
recognized; aggressive forum shopping was the natural by-product. This
disequilibrium decreased the economic value of patents because a patent
holder had difficulty determining the enforceability of her patent.204
201
On July 14, 2011, Rep. Lamar Smith introduced the “Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform
Act of 2011,” which seeks to amend title 28 and eliminate state of incorporation as a basis for venue.
H.R. 2533, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill was referred to committee in July 2011 and has languished
there. The odds are slim that any action will be taken on this bill.
202
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1455 (2010).
203
See id. at 1455–56 (noting the perplexity with which many judges and attorneys encountered
patent law and the inconstant application thereof across the circuits); see also George C. Beighley, Jr.,
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has it Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 675–76 (2011) (“[J]udges of the regional circuit
courts of appeals generally lacked expertise in patent law . . . . Also, the patent decision of the various
circuit courts of appeal were characterized by a lack of uniformity.”).
204
See Beighley, supra note 203, at 677–78 (“[T]he value of a patent often depended on where
the case was tried. The main economic effect of this disparity in treatment of patents across the circuits
was that it prevented the patent owners from ascertaining the validity of their patents and knowing if
they had a valuable patent or worthless patent.” (footnote omitted)); Fromer, supra note 202, at 1464–
65 (recognizing evidence that success rates in patent litigation differ across jurisdictions, and that when
it appears venue is determinative of case outcome the result is “an atmosphere of ex ante legal
uncertainty in which entities are unsure of what the law will require of them”).
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Attempts to bring greater uniformity to patent law and curtail forum
shopping culminated with the enactment and signing into law of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (the “FCIA”).205 The Act created
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which was granted “subject matter
jurisdiction over all patent appeals, trademark appeals from the [United
States Patent and Trademark Office], appeals from the Court of Federal
Claims . . . and other areas of national concern.”206 Congress reasoned that
the new court would (i) be filled with preeminent jurists and scholars of
patent law, (ii) be able to take far more patent appeals than the Supreme
Court, and (iii) have the necessary understanding of the field to issue
opinions that would clarify most circuit splits.207 Ideally, greater
uniformity would ease forum shopping and bring enhanced value and
certainty to the patent market. Over the last thirty years, scholars and
practitioners have noted that the Federal Circuit has largely succeeded in
its efforts to promote greater uniformity in patent law.208
The same problems that plagued patent law prior to 1982 and provided
the impetus for the Federal Circuit currently plague the bankruptcy system.
Indeed, from circuit to circuit, there exists a significant variance in the law
on case-defining bankruptcy issues.209 This variance is one of the primary
incentives for corporate debtors to forum shop. As noted above, seven out
of ten corporate debtors in my study group forum shopped. As was the
case for patent law in the decades prior to the passage of the FCIA, the
Supreme Court appears unable to review the number of cases necessary to
promote uniformity in bankruptcy. Indeed, from 1991 to 2010, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in approximately 1,812 cases.210

205

Beighley, supra note 203, at 699.
Id.
207
Id. at 689, 701–02.
208
See, e.g., id. at 730–31 (noting interviewed judges’ comments that the creation of the Federal
Circuit has brought “greater uniformity” to the field of patent law); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989) (stating that the
Federal Circuit “has articulated rules that are consistent with the underlying philosophy of patent law”);
Donald R. Dunner, A Retrospective of the Federal Circuit’s First 25 Years, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 127, 130
(2007) (“The common view is that [the Federal Circuit] has largely succeeded in its uniformity
efforts.”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW.
U. L. REV. 1619, 1620 (2007) (recognizing that since its establishment, the Federal Circuit has “earned
praise for achieving a desirable degree of uniformity in place of regional circuit precedents perceived to
be disjointed and conflicting”).
209
See cases cited supra note 161.
210
This tally primarily relied on figures published by the Harvard Law Review. In its November
issues from 1991 to 2010, the journal summarized leading cases from the previous Supreme Court
Term and also delineated the total number and subject matter of the Term’s cases. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court, 1990 Term—Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1991); see also Supreme Court
Decisions, 30 August 1990 and After, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/ (last
visited Aug. 30, 2013) (offering an archive of Supreme Court decisions from 1991).
206
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However, only forty-one of these were bankruptcy cases (2%), and only
nineteen of the 1,812 cases (1%) involved corporate debtors.212 As such,
the majority of bankruptcy cases which were granted certiorari involved
consumer bankruptcy issues that offer little guidance to bankruptcy judges
and parties involved in corporate debtor cases.
In the current bankruptcy system, parties generally have the option of
appealing a bankruptcy ruling to the district court sitting in that district or
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) for that district, assuming one
exists. The next step in the appellate process involves the circuit court of
appeals and then the Supreme Court. As previously discussed, the multiple
decades since the Federal Circuit’s creation provide a comprehensive
perspective on the benefits the court has brought to the resolution of patent
disputes. I posit that the Federal Circuit’s positive effect could be
extended to the bankruptcy system. Therefore, I propose a system for
appeals of bankruptcy rulings that borrows from patent and trademark
appeals, as well as appeals of decisions on military veterans’ claims.213
Primarily, local districts would continue to dictate the first level of appeal.
Appeals of bankruptcy court rulings would either go to the federal district
court sitting in that district or the BAP, if one exists in that district. But
appeals of both district court and BAP rulings would go directly to a newly
created United States Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy.214 The court
would have between three and seven Article III judges that would only
hear bankruptcy appeals. This group would be comprised of experienced
bankruptcy academics, practitioners, and judges appointed by the
President.215 This critical mass of bankruptcy experts216 fully devoted to
211

See discussion and sources cited supra note 210.
See discussion and sources cited supra note 210.
213
A military veteran’s benefit claim is first heard by the local veterans’ affairs office. An appeal
from an adverse ruling is heard by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. An appeal from the board’s ruling
is heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims. An appeal from the court of appeals’
ruling is heard by the Federal Circuit. This system allows for multiple steps of lower court review prior
to the involvement of the Federal Circuit. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New
Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1204–10
(2011) (outlining the appellate system relating to veterans’ benefits). See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251–
99 (2006) (providing the organization, jurisdiction, procedure, review, and other characteristics of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims).
214
As previously mentioned, I propose that bankruptcy judges should rule on venue at the outset
of the case or as soon as practicable and such rulings would be interlocutory. To the extent that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy is created, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 should be amended to provide that
an appeal of a venue ruling would be the exclusive jurisdiction of that court. This procedure would
follow the practice for venue rulings in patent disputes and allow for expedited review that minimizes
disruption to the bankruptcy case. See supra Part VI.B.
215
The court’s principal office would be in Washington, D.C., but it would be authorized to sit
anywhere in the United States. This flexibility would facilitate attracting preeminent experts in the
field.
216
The experience of this body would stand in stark contrast to other circuit courts of appeal that
currently hear appeals of district court and BAP rulings. Indeed, with few exceptions and as previously
212
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addressing the disparate treatment of case-dispositive issues across the
circuits would enhance uniformity of business bankruptcy law.217
This uniformity will, in turn, reduce forum shopping to an extent
greater than has been witnessed in patent law. Many believe that the
Federal Circuit, despite its many accomplishments, has been unsuccessful
in curtailing forum shopping to the extent originally anticipated.218
Plaintiffs in patent disputes continue to forum shop, most notably to the
Eastern District of Texas, due to the perception that certain forums have (i)
“plaintiff-friendly juries” and (ii) special procedural rules such as “rules
that compel open discovery with tight deadlines to which the judges
strictly adhere, resulting in quick and relatively inexpensive trials.”219
However, juries play no role in the adjudication of corporate bankruptcy
disputes, so there is no risk of jury shopping in bankruptcy. Further, the
solutions I propose above invariably close many of the procedural
loopholes that motivate forum shoppers. Consequently, the creation of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy, coupled with my other proposed
changes, should significantly alter forum shoppers’ incentives and means.

discussed here, circuit court judges tend to have no background in bankruptcy and are unable to
develop expertise in this area because of the few bankruptcy cases these courts hear.
217
A federal choice-of-law provision may be a worthwhile alternative to this structural change to
the bankruptcy courts. To the extent that the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy is
too radical, the Judicial Conference could instead create a choice-of-law rule for bankruptcy courts.
The rule would state that each bankruptcy case will be governed by the laws of the “place” in which the
debtor has had its principal place of business or its principal assets for the 365 days immediately
preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such 365-day period than the principal place
of business, in the United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such corporation were
located in any other district. The use of the word “place” will allow the court to use federal circuit law
or state law as necessary. To the extent there are multiple debtors, the court would make its evaluation
based on the consolidated corporate family’s assets or principal place of business. A choice-of-law
provision would curtail law shopping and represents a viable alternative.
218
See Fromer, supra note 202, at 1468 (noting that while the creation of the Federal Circuit has
“smoothed out some of the harmful effects of forum shopping,” many of the problems initially sought
to be remedied still remain).
219
Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise
of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH.
193, 206 (2007); see also Dunner, supra note 208, at 130 (referring to the Eastern District of Texas as a
“pro-patentee venue”); Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas
Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 570 (2007) (discussing the appeal
and attraction of many patent litigants to the Eastern District of Texas).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The forum shopping problem in bankruptcy is oversized. The data
establish that 110 of the 159 Megacases filed from January 1, 2007 to June
30, 2012, forum shopped. Over the last two decades, the pace of forum
shopping and the number of parties harmed by the practice has risen
significantly. The problem requires congressional and judicial action on a
variety of levels. This Article proposes unprecedented solutions that target
the bankruptcy venue statute, bankruptcy procedure, and fundamental
elements of bankruptcy court structure. The solutions range from the
intuitive to the radical. But all are necessary in order to install some basic
boundaries and limitations on a harmful practice that is beginning to
predominate.
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APPENDIX
FORUM SHOPPING: DISTRIBUTION AND VENUE BASIS
Corporation
Name

Forum
Shopped

1st Centennial
Bancorp220

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
1

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

C.D. Cal.

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

1

AbitibiBowater
Inc.221

1

D. Del.

1

Accuride
Corp.222

1

D. Del.

1

Advanta
Corp.223

1

D. Del.

1

Affiliated
Media224

1

D. Del.

1

Ahern Rentals,
Inc.225

1

D. Nev.

Aleris
International,
Inc.226

1

D. Del.

1

1

Ambac
Financial
Group, Inc.227

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

AMCORE
Financial,
Inc.228

1

N.D. Ill.

1

220

Affiliate
Filing

In re 1st Centennial Bancorp, No. 09-15570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2009).
In re AbitibiBowater Inc., No. 09-11296 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 16, 2009).
222
In re Accuride Corp., No. 09-13449 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 8, 2009).
223
In re Advanta Corp., No. 09-13931 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 8, 2009).
224
In re Affiliated Media, Inc., No. 10-10202 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 26, 2010).
225
In re Ahern Rentals, Inc., No. 11-53860 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 22, 2011).
226
In re Aleris Int’l, Inc., No. 09-10478 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 12, 2009).
227
In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010).
228
In re AMCORE Fin., Inc., No. 10-37144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2010).
221

Principal
Place of
Assets
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Corporation
Name
American
Home
Mortgage
Investment
Corp.229
American
Media
Operations,
Inc.230

Forum
Shopped

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Affiliate
Filing

1

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

232

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

1

E.D.
Wash.

1

1

Anthracite
Capital, Inc.234

S.D.N.Y.

1

S.D.N.Y.

Apex Silver
Mines Ltd.235

1

S.D.N.Y.

Aventine
Renewable
Energy
Holdings236

1

D. Del.

229

State of
Incorp.

D. Del.

AmericanWest
Bancorporation

Bank
Holdings237

Principal
Place of
Business

1

American
Mortgage
Acceptance
Co.231

AMR Corp.233

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
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1

D. Nev.

Principal
Place of
Assets

1

1

1

1

1

In re Am. Home Mortg. Inv. Corp., No. 07-11048 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 6, 2007).
In re Am. Media Operations, Inc., No. 10-16141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010).
231
In re Am. Mortg. Acceptance Co., No. 10-12196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010).
232
In re AmericanWest Bancorporation, No. 10-06097 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2010).
233
In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011).
234
In re Anthracite Capital, Inc., No. 10-11319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010).
235
In re Apex Silver Mines Ltd., No. 09-10182 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009).
236
In re Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, No. 09-11214 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 7, 2009).
237
In re Bank Holdings, No. 10-55041 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2010).
230

2013]

Corporation
Name
Barzel
Industries
Inc.238

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

1

Beach First
National
Bancshares,
Inc.239

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

D. Del.

1

211

D.S.C.

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

1

1

BearingPoint,
Inc.240

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Blockbuster
Inc.241

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Borders Group,
Inc.242

1

S.D.N.Y.

Buffets
Holdings, Inc.
(‘08)243

1

D. Del.

1

Buffets
Holdings, Inc.
(‘12)244

1

D. Del.

1

Building
Materials
Holding
Corp.245

1

D. Del.

1

Capital Corp of
the West246

238

1

E.D. Cal.

Principal
Place of
Assets

1

1

In re Barzel Indus. Inc., No. 09-13204 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15, 2009).
In re Beach First Nat’l Bancshares, Inc., No. 10-03499 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 14, 2010).
240
In re BearingPoint, Inc., No. 09-10691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009).
241
In re Blockbuster Inc., No. 10-1499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010).
242
In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011).
243
In re Buffets Holdings (‘08), No. 08-10141 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 22, 2008).
244
In re Buffets Holdings (‘12), No. 12-10238 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2012).
245
In re Bldg. Materials Holding Corp., No. 09-12074 (Bankr. D. Del. June 16, 2009).
246
In re Capital Corp. of the W., No. 09-14298 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 11, 2009).
239
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Corporation
Name

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
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Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

Capmark
Financial
Group, Inc.247

1

D. Del.

1

CEI
Liquidation
Estate 248

1

D. Del.

1

Charter
Communicatio
ns, Inc.249

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Chemtura
Corp.250

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Canal Corp.251

1

E.D. Va.

1

CIB Marine
Bancshares,
Inc.252

1

E.D. Wis.

1

Circuit City
Stores, Inc.253

1

E.D. Va.

1

CIT Group
Inc.254

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Citadel
Broadcasting
Corp.255
The Colonial
BancGroup,
Inc.256

247

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

M.D. Ala.

Principal
Place of
Assets

1

1

In re Capmark Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 09-13684 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 25, 2009).
In re CEI Liquidation Estate, No. 09-14019 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 15, 2009).
249
In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-11435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009).
250
In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2009).
251
In re Canal Corp., No. 08-36642 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2008).
252
In re CIB Marine Bancshares, Inc., No. 09-33318 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2009).
253
In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 08-35653 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2008).
254
In re CIT Grp., Inc., No. 09-16565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2009).
255
In re Citadel Broad. Corp., No. 09-17442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2009).
256
In re The Colonial BancGroup, Inc., No. 09-32303 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Aug. 25, 2009).
248

2013]

Corporation
Name

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

Forum
Shopped

Community
Bancorp257

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
1

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

D. Nev.

Constar
International
Inc.258

1

D. Del.

Cooperative
Bankshares,
Inc.259

1

E.D.N.C.

CooperStandard
Holdings
Inc.260

1

D. Del.

Corus
Bankshares,
Inc.261

1

213

N.D. Ill.

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

1

1

1

1

1

Delta Financial
Corp.262

1

D. Del.

1

Delta
Petroleum
Corp.263

1

D. Del.

1

Downey
Financial
Corp.264

1

D. Del.

1

Dynegy
Roseton,
LLC265

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Eastman
Kodak Co.266

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

257

In re Cmty. Bancorp, No. 10-20038 (Bankr. D. Nev. May 28, 2010).
In re Constar Int’l, Inc., No. 08-13432 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 30, 2008).
259
In re Coop. Bankshares, Inc., No. 09-06989 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2009).
260
In re Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc., No. 09-12743 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 3, 2009).
261
In re Corus Bankshares, Inc., No. 10-26881 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 15, 2010).
262
In re Delta Fin. Corp., No. 07-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 17, 2007).
263
In re Delta Petroleum Corp., No. 11-14006 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 15, 2011).
264
In re Downey Fin. Corp., No. 08-13041 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 25, 2008).
265
In re Dynegy Roseton, L.L.C., No. 11-38107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011).
266
In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012).
258

Principal
Place of
Assets
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Corporation
Name

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
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Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

EBHI
Holdings,
Inc.267

1

D. Del.

Energy
Partners,
Ltd.268

1

S.D. Tex.

1

FairPoint
Communicatio
ns, Inc.269

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

1

Finlay
Enterprises,
Inc.270

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

First National
Bancshares,
Inc.271

1

D.S.C.

1

FirstFed
Financial
Corporation.272

1

C.D. Cal.

1

Fleetwood
Enterprises,
Inc.273

1

C.D. Cal.

1

Franklin Bank
Corporation.274

1

Fremont
General
Corporation.275
Frontier
Airlines
Holdings,
Inc.276

267

D. Del.

1

1

C.D. Cal.

S.D.N.Y.

Principal
Place of
Assets

1

1

1

In re EBHI Holdings, Inc., No. 09-12099 (Bankr. D. Del. June 17, 2009).
In re Energy Partners, Ltd., No. 09-32957 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 1, 2009).
269
In re FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-16335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2009).
270
In re Finlay Enter., Inc., No. 09-14873 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2009).
271
In re First Nat’l Bancshares, Inc., No. 10-09281 (Bankr. D.S.C. Dec. 31, 2010).
272
In re FirstFed Fin. Corp., No. 10-12927 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010).
273
In re Fleetwood Enter., Inc., No. 09-14254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2009).
274
In re Franklin Bank Corp., No. 08-12924 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 12, 2008).
275
In re Fremont Gen. Corp., No. 08-13421 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 18, 2008).
276
In re Frontier Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 08-11298 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008).
268

2013]

Corporation
Name
General
Growth
Properties,
Inc.277

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

Forum
Shopped

1

General
Maritime
Corp.278
General
Motors
Corp.279
Global
Aviation
Holdings
Inc.280
The Great
Atlantic &
Pacific Tea
Company.281
Guaranty
Financial
Group, Inc.282

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

S.D.N.Y.

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

1

E.D.N.Y.

1

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

1

N.D. Tex.

1

C.D .Cal.

1

Hartmarx
Corp.284

1

N.D. Ill.

1

1

D. Del.
(Trans. to
D. Haw.)

Principal
Place of
Assets

1

1

277

Affiliate
Filing

1

Harrington
West Financial
Group, Inc.283

Hawaiian
Telcom
Communicatio
ns, Inc.285

State of
Incorp.

S.D.N.Y.

1

215

1

In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009).
In re Gen. Mar. Corp., No. 11-15285 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011).
279
In re Gen. Motors Corp., No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009).
280
In re Global Aviation Holdings Inc., No. 12-40783 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2012).
281
In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No. 10-24549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010).
282
In re Guar. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 09-35582 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2009).
283
In re Harrington W. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-14677 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010).
284
In re Hartmarx Corp., No. 09-02046 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2009).
285
In re Hawaiian Telcom Comm’ns, Inc., No. 08-13086 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 1, 2008).
278
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Corporation
Name

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Hawker
Beechcraft
Acquisition
Co.286

1

S.D.N.Y.

Hayes
Lemmerz
International,
Inc.287

1

D. Del.

Herbst
Gaming, Inc.288

1

D. Nev.

HomeBanc
Corp.289

1

D. Del.

Principal
Place of
Business

1

1

Imperial
Capital
Bancorp,
Inc.291

1

S.D. Cal.

1

IndyMac
Bancorp,
Inc.292

1

C.D. Cal.

1

Integrity
Bancshares,
Inc.293

1

N.D. Ga.

1

286

S.D.N.Y.

1

S.D. Ind.

Principal
Place of
Assets

1

N.D. Tex.

Irwin Financial
Corporation.295

Affiliate
Filing

1

1

1

State of
Incorp.

1

Idearc, Inc.290

ION Media
Networks,
Inc.294

[Vol. 46:159

1

1

In re Hawker Beechcraft Acquisition Co., No. 12-11877 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012).
In re Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., No. 09-11655 (Bankr. D. Del. May 11, 2009).
288
In re Herbst Gaming, Inc., No. 09-50752 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 22, 2009).
289
In re HomeBanc Corp., No. 07-11080 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 9, 2007).
290
In re Idearc, Inc., No. 09-31828 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009).
291
In re Imperial Capital Bancorp, Inc., No. 09-19431 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009).
292
In re IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., No. 08-21752 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 31, 2008).
293
In re Integrity Bancshares, Inc., No. 08-80512 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2008).
294
In re ION Media Networks, Inc., No. 09-13125 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009).
295
In re Irwin Fin. Corp., No. 09-13852 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2009).
287

2013]

Corporation
Name

Journal
Register Co.296

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

1

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

N.D. Ill.

1

LandAmerica
Financial
Group, Inc.298

1

E.D. Va.

1

Lear Corp.299

1

S.D.N.Y.

Lee
Enterprises,
Inc.300

1

D. Del.

1

S.D.N.Y.

Principal
Place of
Assets
1

1

1

1

1

Linens ‘n
Things, Inc.302

1

D. Del.

1

Local Insight
Regatta
Holdings303

1

D. Del.

1

Luminent
Mortgage
Capital, Inc.304

1

D. Md.

1

296

Affiliate
Filing

S.D.N.Y.

Kimball Hill,
Inc.297

Lehman
Brothers
Holdings
Inc.301

217

In re Journal Register Co., No. 09-10769 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2009).
In re Kimball Hill, Inc., No. 08-10095 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2008).
298
In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2008).
299
In re Lear Corp., No. 09-14326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009).
300
In re Lee Enters., Inc., No. 11-13918 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 12, 2011).
301
In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008).
302
In re Linens ‘n Things, Inc., No. 08-10833 (Bankr. D. Del. May 2, 2008).
303
In re Local Insight Regatta Holdings, No. 10-13686 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 17, 2010).
304
In re Luminent Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 08-21389 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 5, 2008).
297
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Corporation
Name

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
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Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

Lyondell
Chemical
Co.305

1

S.D.N.Y.

Magna
Entertainment
Corp.306

1

D. Del.

1

MagnaChip
Semiconductor
LLC307

1

D. Del.

1

Merisant
Worldwide,
Inc.308

1

D. Del.

1

Meruelo Farms
LLC309

1

C.D. Cal.

Mesa Air
Group, Inc.310

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

1

1

1

MF Global
Holdings
Ltd.311

1

S.D.N.Y.

Midwest Banc
Holdings,
Inc.312

1

N.D. Ill.

1

Milacron
Inc.313

1

S.D. Ohio

1

305

Principal
Place of
Assets

In re Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2009).
In re Magna Entm’t Corp., No. 09-10720 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 5, 2009).
307
In re MagnaChip Semiconductor LLC, No. 09-12009 (Bankr. D. Del. June 12, 2009).
308
In re Merisant Worldwide, Inc., No. 09-10059 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009).
309
In re Meruelo Farms LLC, No. 09-13358 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2009).
310
In re Mesa Air Grp., Inc., No. 10-10018 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010).
311
In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011).
312
In re Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc., No. 10-37319 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2010).
313
In re MI 2009 Inc., No. 09-11235 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2009).
306

2013]

Corporation
Name

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

219

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

Monaco Coach
Corp.314

1

D. Del.

Movie Gallery,
Inc. (‘07)315

1

E.D. Va.

1

Movie Gallery,
Inc. (‘10)316

1

E.D. Va.

1

Nebraska Book
Co.317

1

D. Del.

1

Neff Corp.318

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

NetBank,
Inc.319

1

M.D. Fla.

New Century
Financial
Corp.320

1

D. Del.

Newark Group,
Inc.321
NewPage
Corp.322

314

1

1

D.N.J.

D. Del.

1

1

1

1

1

In re MCC, No. 09-10750 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 5, 2009).
In re Movie Gallery, Inc., No. 07-33849 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2007).
316
In re Movie Gallery, Inc., No. 10-30696 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2010).
317
In re Neb. Book Co. Inc., No. 11-12005 (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2011).
318
In re NR Liquidation Ill Co. Inc., No. 10-12610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May. 16, 2010).
319
In re NetBank, Inc., No. 07-04295 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2007).
320
In re New Century Fin. Corp., No. 07-10417 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2007).
321
In re Newark Grp., Inc., No. 91-32683 (Banr. D.N.J. May 10, 1991).
322
In re NewPage Corp., No. 11-12804 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 7, 2011).
315

Principal
Place of
Assets

220
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Corporation
Name
Nexity
Financial
Corp.323

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

1

Noble
International,
Ltd.324

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

D. Del.

1

[Vol. 46:159

E.D.
Mich.

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

1

1

Nortel
Networks
Corp.325

1

D. Del.

1

NTK Holdings,
Inc.326

1

D. Del.

1

Orleans
Homebuilders,
Inc.327

1

D. Del.

1

PFF Bancorp,
Inc.328

1

D. Del.

1

Pilgrim’s Pride
Corp.329

1

N.D. Tex.

1

Pinnacle
Airlines
Corp.330

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Pliant Corp.331

1

D. Del.

323

1

In re Nexity Fin. Corp., No. 10-12293 (Bankr. D. Del. July 22, 2010).
In re Noble Int’l, Ltd., No. 09-51720 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 2009).
325
In re Nortel Networks Corp., No. 09-10138 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 14, 2009).
326
In re NTK Holdings, Inc., No. 09-13611 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 21, 2009).
327
In re Orleans Homebuilders, Inc., No. 10-10684 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 1, 2010).
328
In re PFF Bancorp, Inc., No. 08-13127 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 5, 2008).
329
In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 08-45664 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2008).
330
In re Pinnacle Airlines Corp., No. 12-11343 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2012).
331
In re Pliant Corp., No. 09-10443 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009).
324

Principal
Place of
Assets

2013]

Corporation
Name

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

PMI Group,
Inc.332

1

D. Del.

1

Pope & Talbot,
Inc.333

1

D. Del.

1

Propex, Inc.334

1

E.D.
Tenn.

1

D. Del.

1

Remy
International,
Inc.336

1

D. Del.

1

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Sbarro, Inc.338

1

S.D.N.Y.

Seahawk
Drilling, Inc.339

1

S.D. Tex.

1

M.D. Ga.

1

Security Bank
Corp.340

332

1

Affiliate
Filing

1

R.H.
Donnelley
Corp.335

RHI
Entertainment,
Inc.337

221

1

In re PMI Grp., Inc., No. 11-13730 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 23, 2011).
In re Pope & Talbot, Inc., No. 07-11738 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 19, 2007).
334
In re Fabrics Estate Inc., No. 08-10249 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008).
335
In re R.H. Donnelley Corp., No. 09-11833 (Bankr. D. Del. May 28, 2009).
336
In re Remy Int’l, Inc., No. 07-11481 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 8, 2007).
337
In re RHI Entm’t, Inc., No. 10-16536 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2010).
338
In re Sbarro, Inc., No. 11-11527 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011).
339
In re Seahawk Drilling, Inc., No. 11-20089 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2011).
340
In re Sec. Bank Corp., No. 09-52409 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 31, 2009).
333

Principal
Place of
Assets
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Corporation
Name

Forum
Shopped

Silver State
Bancorp341

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
1

[Vol. 46:159

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

D. Nev.

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

1

Simmons
Co.342

1

D. Del.

Sirva, Inc.343

1

S.D.N.Y.

Premier
International
Holdings
Inc.344

1

D. Del.

1

Smurfit-Stone
Container
Corp.345

1

D. Del.

1

Source
Interlink Co.346

1

D. Del.

1

Spansion
Inc.347

1

D. Del.

1

Spectrum
Brands, Inc.348

1

W.D. Tex.

1

Station
Casinos, Inc.349

1

D. Nev.

1

341

1

1

In re Silver State Bancorp, No. 09-10069 (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2009).
In re Simmons Co., No. 09-14038 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 16, 2009).
343
In re Sirva, Inc., No. 08-10433 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2008).
344
In re Premier Int’l Holdings Inc., No. 09-12019 (Bankr. D. Del. June 13, 2009).
345
In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 09-10235 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 26, 2009).
346
In re Source Interlink Co., No. 09-11424 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 27, 2009).
347
In re Spansion Inc., No. 09-10690 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 1, 2009).
348
In re Spectrum Brands, Inc., No. 09-50456 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009).
349
In re Station Casinos, Inc., No. 09-52477 (Bankr. D. Nev. July 28, 2009).
342

Principal
Place of
Assets

2013]

Corporation
Name

MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
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Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

Syntax-Brillian
Corp.350

1

D. Del.

Tarragon
Corp.351

1

D.N.J.

1

TBS
International
plc352

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Team
Financial,
Inc.353

1

D. Kan.

1

C.D. Cal.

1

Temecula
Valley
Bancorp Inc.354

1

1

TerreStar
Corp.355

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

TerreStar
Networks
Inc.356

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

The Reader's
Digest Ass’n357

1

S.D.N.Y.

350

Principal
Place of
Assets

1

In re Syntax-Brillian Corp., No. 08-11407 (Bankr. D. Del. July 8, 2008).
In re Tarragon Corp., No. 09-10555 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2009).
352
In re TBS Int’l plc, No. 12-22225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012).
353
In re Team Fin., Inc., No. 09-10925 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2009).
354
In re Temecula Valley Bancorp Inc., No. 09-36828 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009).
355
In re TerreStar Corp., No. 11-10612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011).
356
In re TerreStar Networks Inc., No. 10-15446 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010).
357
In re Reader’s Digest Ass’n, No. 09-23529 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).
351
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Corporation
Name

Thornburg
Mortgage,
Inc.358

Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop

1

[Vol. 46:159

Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

D. Md.

State of
Incorp.

1

TierOne
Corp.359

1

D. Neb.

1

TOUSA,
Inc.360

1

S.D. Fla.

1

Tribune Co.361

1

D. Del.

1

Trico Marine
Services,
Inc.362

1

D. Del.

1

Tronox Inc.363

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Trump
Entertainment
Resorts, Inc.364

1

D.N.J.

1

TXCO
Resources
Inc.365

1

W.D. Tex.

1

358

Affiliate
Filing

In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc., No. 09-17787 (Bankr. D. Md. May 1, 2009).
In re TierOne Corp., No. 10-41974 (Bankr. D. Neb. June 24, 2010).
360
In re TOUSA, Inc., No. 08-10928 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2008).
361
In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 8, 2008).
362
In re Trico Marine Servs., Inc., No. 10-12653 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 25, 2010).
363
In re Tronox Inc., No. 09-10156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009).
364
In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, Inc., No. 09-13655 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2009).
365
In re TXCO Res. Inc., No. 09-51807 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 17, 2009).
359

Principal
Place of
Assets

2013]

Corporation
Name
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Forum
Shopped

Did
Not
Forum
Shop
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Bases for Establishing Venue
District
Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

UCBH
Holdings366

1

N.D. Cal.

1

United
Western
Bancorp,
Inc.367

1

D. Colo.

1

State of
Incorp.

Affiliate
Filing

VeraSun
Energy
Corp.368

1

D. Del.

1

Vertis
Holdings,
Inc.369

1

S.D.N.Y.

1

Vertis, Inc.370

1

D. Del.

Vineyard
National
Bancorp371

1

C.D. Cal.

Visteon
Corp.372

1

D. Del.

Washington
Mutual, Inc.373

1

D. Del.

366

1

1

1

1

In re UCBH Holdings, No. 09-33701 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009).
In re United W. Bancorp, Inc., No. 12-13815 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2012).
368
In re VeraSun Energy Corp., No. 08-12606 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 31, 2008).
369
In re Vertis Holdings, Inc., No. 10-16170 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010).
370
In re Vertis, Inc., No. 08-11461 (Bankr. D. Del. July 15, 2008).
371
In re Vineyard Nat’l Bancorp, No. 09-26401 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 21, 2009).
372
In re Visteon Corp., No. 09-11786 (Bankr. D. Del. May 28, 2009).
373
In re Wash. Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 26, 2008).
367

Principal
Place of
Assets
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Filed

Principal
Place of
Business

State of
Incorp.

WCI
Communities,
Inc.374

1

D. Del.

Wellman,
Inc.375

1

S.D.N.Y.

William Lyon
Homes376

1

D. Del.

1

Xerium
Technologies,
Inc.377

1

D. Del.

1

Young
Broadcasting,
Inc.378

TOTALS

374

1

110

49

S.D.N.Y.

Affiliate
Filing

1

1

1

56

53

45

In re WCI Cmtys., Inc., No. 08-11643 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 4, 2008).
In re Wellman, Inc., No. 08-10595 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008).
376
In re William Lyon Homes, No. 11-14019 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 19, 2011).
377
In re Xerium Techs., Inc., No. 10-11031 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 30, 2010).
378
In re Young Broad., Inc., No. 09-10645 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2009).
375

Principal
Place of
Assets

5

